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Gary Pulsinelli*
Abstract: In its 1999 decision in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
protected states from suit for patent infringement, effectively making state universities
immune from intellectual property suits. This Article analyzes how the Florida Prepaid
decision affects researchers at state universities, and how those researchers may avoid
liability under existing law. It first concludes that researchers at state universities might still
be subject to injunctions against future infringement. The Article next observes that
individual researchers at state universities might also face personal liability for damages, but
then suggests that researchers at state universities should be entitled to assert qualified
immunity when they are accused of patent or copyright infringement, and thereby potentially
avoid liability. It then provides a framework for applying this qualified immunity, proposing
that courts should grant researchers at state universities qualified immunity when their
conduct does not violate a clearly established right of the patentee or copyright holder.
Whether such a violation has occurred should be analyzed in much the same way that willful
infringement is analyzed. Going beyond existing law, this article proposes a counterthrust
against the current trend towards diminishing the public domain, in the form of legislation
granting researchers at state universities absolute immunity from liability for patent and
copyright infringement. Such a grant of immunity would create in state universities a space
for exploring and developing new innovations that would otherwise be blocked by the
presence of intellectual property protection—a particularly acute problem in some areas,
where a veritable “patent thicket” would necessitate that any researcher desiring to work in
those areas license a prohibitive number of patents from a variety of patentees. Thus freed
from concerns over patent infringement, researchers at state universities could continue their
work for the benefit of the citizens of their states and the public, in keeping with the mission
of state universities.
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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Alice Little is a professor at a state university who studies the
basic science involved in cloning agricultural animals, particularly
cattle.1 Her research is directed at helping farmers in her state, and all
over the world, improve their stock by cloning and preserving the very
best of their animals. By helping the farmers who feed us, Dr. Little also
hopes her work will indirectly benefit the citizens of her state and the
public. However, Dr. Little has a problem. The existing protocol for
cloning agricultural animals (or any other mammal) is very complicated,
containing many difficult steps. Furthermore, each of these steps is
incredibly inefficient, resulting in very low yields. Dr. Little and her
laboratory are hard at work trying to streamline the protocol and increase
its efficiency. Her problem is that various commercial entities have
obtained patents on, and therefore claim ownership over, many of the
necessary steps in the cloning process. These commercial entities have
begun sending her letters threatening to file suit for patent infringement
unless she either stops her research or pays them for the privilege of
continuing her basic research into the fundamentals of the cloning
process.2 She has become extremely frustrated over the rising level of
patenting of these basic techniques that she needs to perform her
research, and the concomitant difficulty in actually getting any research
done.

1. Dr. Little is fictional. However, the outline of her situation is similar to that of Dr. J. Lannett
Edwards, who communicated the basic facts to me in a series of personal communications.
Discussions with Dr. J. Lannett Edwards, Associate Professor, University of Tennessee, in
Knoxville, Tenn. (numerous conversations from 2002–2007). Dr. Edwards’s home page at the
University of Tennessee is available at http://animalscience.ag.utk.edu/faculty/edwards.htm and a
summary of her research projects at http://animalscience.ag.utk.edu/faculty/edwards_research.htm.
For more on the University of Tennessee’s Cloning Project, see http://animalscience.ag.utk.edu/
utcloneproject/default.html.
2. See, e.g., Letter from Richard J. Warburg, Brobeck Phlager & Harrison LLP (on behalf of
Infigen, Inc.) to Dr. Kelly R. Robbins, Professor & Dep’t Head, Animal Sci. Dep’t, The Univ. of
Tenn. (Sept. 8, 2000) (on file with author) (“Notice of Potential Use of Methods from United States
Patent Nos. 5,496,720 and 6,077,710 [covering certain mammalian cloning methods]”).
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Dr. Little has at least two objections to the patents. First, she believes
that the patents were improvidently granted by the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office (PTO). In her view, many of the claimed method steps
were well known to those versed in the cloning art, or at least obvious
from that art, before the patent applications were filed.3 She also
believes that at least some of the patentees have failed to comply with
their disclosure obligations under the patent laws.4 However, now that
the patents have been granted, she would bear a heavy and costly burden
if she attempted to convince a court that the patents were invalid.5 Dr.
Little objects to having her research held hostage to patents that she
believes should never have been granted in the first place, with her only
recourse in expensive procedures in court or before the PTO.
More fundamentally, she objects to this commercial intrusion into the
traditional culture of basic scientific research.6 While she has no
objections to patents when they are confined to the commercial appliedresearch sphere, Dr. Little shares the belief of many basic researchers,
particularly academic researchers, that requiring a license to perform
basic research is contrary to the essential culture of science, which
should view this fundamental research as a cooperative endeavor to
unravel the secrets of nature.7 As part of this cooperative endeavor,
scientists should freely share their tools with other scientists in the
interest of their shared effort to understand the natural world. Because
she views basic research as a cooperative endeavor, under no
circumstances would Dr. Little consider licensing the underlying
technology she needs for her basic research.8 And her problem is
magnified if the patentee wishes to block all others from performing the
research at all, so that its own research can proceed without competition.
Such a patentee could shut down Dr. Little’s research completely, at
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (anticipation by prior art); id. § 103 (nonobviousness).
4. See id. § 112 (disclosure requirements).
5. See id. § 282 (issued patent presumed valid).
6. I use the term “basic research” to refer to research into fundamental scientific problems that do
not have direct commercial application, in contrast to “applied research” into practical problems
with direct commercial application. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 178 n.1 (1987) (providing a similar
definition, but also noting the difficulties of making the distinction in many contexts).
7. See generally id.; Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights
and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
8. Even if she were willing, she might run afoul of her government grant if she diverted funds
which were already earmarked for other purposes into the payment of royalties. And even if such a
diversion were permitted, it would drain the funds so used away from her research.
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least until she could find a way to work around the claims of the patent
(assuming such a work-around even exists). Further exacerbating this
problem is the sheer number of different commercial entities claiming
rights over different steps of the process. Navigating her way through
this thicket of patents and coming to terms with each of the necessary
parties—any one of whom holds the power to shut down her research—
promises to be difficult, if not impossible. What is more, Dr. Little is
only one of the tens of thousands of researchers at state universities
around the country, more and more of whom find themselves facing this
same kind of commercial threat to their basic research projects.
Dr. Little might find some hope in the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision
in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,9 where the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
protects the states from suit for patent infringement.10 Under Florida
Prepaid, a state and its universities are immune from suit on patents.
Under the logic of the decision, this immunity should also extend to
copyright and federal trademark infringement.11 While that is fine for the
state and university, Dr. Little is more concerned with the impact of the
decision on her personally.
Despite the introduction of several bills into Congress that attempted
to avoid the limitations of the Florida Prepaid decision and make the
states liable for intellectual property infringements,12 none of these
proposals has been enacted to date, and so state sovereign immunity
from suit for intellectual property infringements remains the rule. It is
therefore important to assess the implications of the decision in realworld intellectual property and state government contexts. Several
commentators have already undertaken parts of this task.13 However,
almost all of this commentary comes from the perspective of the
intellectual property holder, and addresses how the states might be made
liable to that holder.
9. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
10. See id. at 647–48.
11. This extension is discussed infra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 106th Cong.
(1999); Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong.
13. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399 (2000); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1331 (2001); Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese, & Ernest A. Young, State
Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How To “Fix” Florida Prepaid (and
How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037 (2001).
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This Article focuses instead on how the Florida Prepaid decision
affects individual state employees, in particular researchers and teachers
at state universities, like Dr. Little, and how such researchers and
teachers may avoid liability under existing law. Although prior
commentary touches on possible ways individual researchers might
avoid liability, in the course of considering obstacles that intellectual
property holders must overcome to get relief, the analysis does not focus
on the avoidance of individual liability or fully develop the possibilities
it presents.
First, even though states, and hence state universities, are immune
from liability for infringement damages, researchers at those universities
might still be subject to injunctions against future infringement, which
could have a devastating effect on research projects.14 However, this
Article suggests that the existing remedial schemes in the intellectual
property laws may preclude such proceedings for injunctive relief, and
that practical considerations may also in many instances make them
undesirable to intellectual property holders. Furthermore, recent trends
in the equitable analysis of injunctive relief in patent cases indicate that
persuading courts to grant such injunctions may be getting more
difficult. Courts may instead give researchers the option to either pay an
ongoing royalty for future use, as set by the court, or stop using the
technology.15
Second, even though states and universities are immune from suit,
researchers at state universities, like Dr. Little, might face personal
liability for damages, a daunting prospect that may well dampen the
desire to perform research at state institutions.16 This Article suggests
that, under current law, researchers at state universities should be
entitled to assert qualified immunity when they are accused of patent or
copyright infringement, and thereby potentially avoid liability.17 The
rationale for this qualified immunity is rooted in the traditional doctrines
of patent experimental use and copyright fair use, doctrines that are

14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (denying an injunction as a
remedy for patent infringement).
16. See infra Part II.C. Since private institutions are not immune from suit and they have deep
pockets, a patentee will generally choose to sue the institution along with its individual researchers,
with the institution ultimately footing the bill for both the cost of the defense and any damages
awarded. Any injunctive relief won by the patentee in such a suit would apply to both the institution
and the individual researcher.
17. See infra Part III.B.
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designed to advance the goals of the intellectual property systems by
making their fruits available to subsequent users for purposes that are
socially beneficial.18 Researchers at state universities like Dr. Little are
excellent candidates to take advantage of these doctrines because they
are performing research and teaching duties largely for the benefit of
their states and for society as a whole rather than directly for their own
profit. These researchers at state universities are therefore also excellent
candidates for a qualified immunity defense rooted in these doctrines.
This Article then provides a framework for applying this qualified
immunity under current law, proposing that courts should grant
researchers at state universities qualified immunity when their conduct
does not violate a clearly established right of the patentee or copyright
holder. Whether such a violation has occurred should be analyzed in this
context in much the same way that willful infringement is analyzed.19
Thus, if Dr. Little’s legitimate belief that the patents are invalid and that
her research therefore does not infringe those patents is objectively
reasonable, she should be immune from personal liability for damages,
even if a court eventually concludes that her belief was mistaken.
Looking beyond existing law and considering possible legislative
changes, this Article’s focus on researchers at state universities reveals
the great opportunity presented by Florida Prepaid: the possibility of
using the case to create a sphere in which researchers and teachers at
state universities can study and improve upon protected inventions and
creative works, and thus advance the interests of the public in ways that
might otherwise be blocked.20 That is, rather than attempting to avoid
Florida Prepaid and thereby increase the liability of states and state
officials, we should embrace the decision and thereby decrease liability
for Dr. Little and other researchers at state universities. At best, the law
as it presently exists might provide a limited protection for these
researchers, in the form of qualified immunity against liability for
damages. However, the current trend towards diminishing the public
domain—through such developments as expanding patentable subject
matter, increasing numbers of patents on basic research techniques,
lengthening copyright terms, diminishing recognition of copyright fair
use and patent experimental use, and an escalating tendency to sue for

18. The experimental use and fair use doctrines are discussed infra Parts III.B.2.a and III.B.2.b,
respectively.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. See infra Part V.
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any perceived intellectual property violation—has created the need for a
counterthrust to restore at least part of what has been lost.
This Article proposes such a counterthrust in the form of legislation
granting researchers at state universities, like Dr. Little, absolute
immunity from liability for patent and copyright infringement. Such a
grant of immunity would create in state universities a space for
exploring and developing new innovations that would otherwise be
blocked by the presence of intellectual property protection—a
particularly acute problem in some areas, such as Dr. Little’s cloning
research, where a veritable “patent thicket” would necessitate that any
researcher desiring to work in those areas license a prohibitive number
of patents from a variety of patentees.21 Although many of the arguments
for such absolute immunity might also support a broader immunity for
all researchers at universities (and even similar institutions), state
universities do have some unique features, particularly a strong public
purpose and strong public oversight, that make them well suited to the
task of protecting the public domain. If researchers at state universities
were thus freed from concerns with patent infringement, Dr. Little (and
others like her) could continue her work for the benefit of her state’s
farmers, and thus indirectly for the benefit of her state’s citizens and the
public, in keeping with the mission of her state university.
The focus of this Article is on the research context, rather than
teaching, and particularly on patent infringement, rather than copyright
infringement. However, much of the analysis applies to both research
and teaching, and to both copyrights and patents; the similarities and
differences in the analysis are noted in many places in this Article. In
addition, the law involving the Eleventh Amendment, sovereign
immunity, and civil rights is elaborate and complex, and this Article
attempts little more than a survey of those areas. The focus of this
Article is on intellectual property issues, and so those other bodies of
law are discussed only as required to give context to the intellectual
property issues. For this reason, this Article also avoids resolving some
of the complex questions raised by sovereign immunity and its
abrogation, where such resolution is unnecessary to the proposed
immunities.
21. Cf. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120 (Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner, & Scott
Stern eds., 2000), available at http://books.google.com/books (search “navigating the patent
thicket”; then follow “Innovation Policy and the Economy—Page 119” hyperlink) (defining the
“packet thicket”).
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Part I of this Article describes some of the history of the Eleventh
Amendment and its more recent application to federal intellectual
property jurisprudence. Part II explores the current state of the world
under the Florida Prepaid immunity regime, with particular emphasis on
the status of researchers at state universities. Next, Part III focuses on a
particular aspect of that current regime, the role of qualified immunity in
suits against researchers sued in their individual capacities. Part III also
explores some doctrines under patent and copyright law that might serve
to justify the application of qualified immunity in intellectual property
suits against researchers at state universities. Part IV describes a
proposed framework under existing law for applying qualified immunity
in intellectual property suits against researchers at state universities.
Finally, Part V moves beyond existing law and explores the possibility
of federal legislation that converts this qualified immunity into an
absolute immunity, in the interest of restoring a portion of the eroding
public domain.
I.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY

A.

Historical Background of the Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment was enacted as a response to the Supreme
Court’s 1793 decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.22 In Chisholm, the Court
had held that, because Article III of the Constitution provided that “[t]he
judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend . . . to
Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State,”23 an
unconsenting state could be sued in federal court by a citizen of another
state.24 This holding created considerable concern among the states that
they might be subject to suit on their Revolutionary War debts.25 In
response, Congress quickly passed the Eleventh Amendment in 1794
and the requisite number of states ratified the amendment in a very short
22. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The history of the Eleventh Amendment is convoluted and
complex, and I attempt only the minimum necessary to lend context to the rest of this article. For a
good summary of the issues, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 7.1–7.7 (4th ed.
2003). A more detailed exposition may be found in 1 JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR.,
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS ¶¶ 2.01–2.03 (2006).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.2, at 401 (discussing Chisholm).
25. See id. at 402.
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time, although the presidential proclamation declaring the amendment to
have been properly ratified was not issued for another three years.26
The text of the Eleventh Amendment reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.27
By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment precludes only suits against a
state in federal courts by citizens of another state. Furthermore, many
commentators have argued that the text and history of the Amendment
suggest that it was meant only to apply to diversity jurisdiction in such
suits, and was not meant to preclude jurisdiction over federal
questions.28 However, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted for the majority
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida29 and reiterated in Florida
Prepaid:
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict
only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts,
“we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it
confirms.” That presupposition, first observed over a century
ago in Hans v. Louisiana, has two parts: first, that each State is a
sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that “‘[i]t is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent.’” For over a century we
have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against
unconsenting States “was not contemplated by the Constitution
when establishing the judicial power of the United States.”30

26. See id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
28. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.3, at 407–08 and sources cited therein. At the
time of the Eleventh Amendment’s passage, diversity jurisdiction was the only jurisdiction the
federal courts had, and thus the omission of federal question jurisdiction from the amendment is
hardly surprising. See William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1381 (1989) (“[T]he framers of the eleventh
amendment were not faced with any immediate possibility that states would be sued in federal court
on federal grounds. First, there was no statutory basis for federal jurisdiction; it was not until 1875
that general federal question jurisdiction was provided. Second, there were no federal laws which
provided causes of action against the states.” (footnotes omitted)).
29. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
30. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634–35
(1999) (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54) (citations omitted, other omissions in original).
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Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment also
immunizes unconsenting states against federal question suits by their
own citizens,31 suits by foreign nations,32 federal administrative agency
proceedings,33 and even suits in their own state courts.34 The Court
views the Eleventh Amendment as a codification of the states’ inherent
sovereign immunity, and it interprets the Amendment accordingly.35
B.

Applying the Eleventh Amendment to Intellectual Property

1.

Atascadero and Its Progeny

Historically, the general understanding among practitioners was that
states were liable for infringements of intellectual property rights in the
same way as private citizens,36 and in fact some courts had so held.37
That understanding was altered by the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.38 In Atascadero, the Court held
that if Congress wished to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity and
make them subject to suit in federal court, then Congress must declare
its intent to do so explicitly in the statute itself.39 The Court
acknowledged that under its prior holdings Congress had the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but it did not address the question of whether Congress
might make such an abrogation under other powers.40
31. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
32. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
33. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
34. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
35. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.3, at 408; see generally id. at 402–09. For that reason,
this Article uses the terms “state sovereign immunity” and “Eleventh Amendment immunity”
interchangeably.
36. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. GAO-01-811, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
STATE IMMUNITY IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS 4 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d01811.pdf [hereinafter ELEVENTH AMENDMENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT]
(“Historically, state governments have sued and been sued by others in federal court for intellectual
property infringement just like any other owner or user of intellectual property.”).
37. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979) (state not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity in copyright infringement suit).
38. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
39. Id. at 243 (“[W]e hold . . . that Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.”).
40. Id. at 238 (“[W]hen acting pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the States’ consent.” (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
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Because the existing federal patent, copyright, and trademark statutes
lacked such a clear statement of intent, courts soon held that they failed
the Atascadero test. In Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown,41 the
Fourth Circuit held that the Copyright Act did not contain a clear
statement of intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and so states were immune from suit for copyright
infringement.42 Subsequent cases extended this immunity to patent
infringement.43
2.

Union Gas

The Supreme Court subsequently addressed the question not
answered in Atascadero, specifically: Under what circumstances does
Congress have the power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the
states? The Court’s first foray into the area was its 1989 decision in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.44 In that decision, a fractured court held
that the Commerce Clause of Article I of the Constitution granted
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and that
Congress had in fact done so in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) as
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA).45 Thus, Union Gas “held that Congress could override the
U.S. 445, 456 (1976))). Abrogation under Section 5 is discussed infra notes 65–69 and
accompanying text.
41. 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988).
42. Id. at 120 (“[W]e hold that the language of the Copyright Act, considered as a whole, does not
clearly and unequivocally indicate Congress’s intent to create a cause of action for money damages
enforceable against the states in federal court, thereby directly abrogating the states’ eleventh
amendment immunity.”); accord Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989);
BV Eng’g v. Univ. of Cal., L.A., 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988).
43. See, e.g., Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that the Patent Act
did not abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity).
44. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
45. Id. at 23. Four Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) concluded that Congress
both had abrogated immunity with sufficient clarity and had the power to do so under Article I. Id.
at 23. One Justice (White) concluded that Congress had not acted with sufficient clarity but had the
requisite power. Id. at 45 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). One
Justice (Scalia) concluded that Congress had acted with sufficient clarity but lacked the power to do
so. Id. at 29, 35–42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Finally, three Justices
(Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy) concluded that Congress had not acted with sufficient clarity
and lacked the power to abrogate immunity anyway, and so joined various parts of the opinions by
Justices White and Scalia. See also id. at 57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Counting votes, the clarity
and power holdings each prevailed by a 5–4 vote, but not the same 5–4 vote.
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Eleventh Amendment pursuant to any of its constitutional powers, so
long as the law was explicit in its text authorizing suits against state
governments.”46
3.

The Remedy Clarification Acts

Congress responded to Atascadero and its intellectual property
progeny in 1992 by using its power under Article I (as recognized in
Union Gas) to enact three statutes: the Patent and Plant Variety Remedy
Clarification Act,47 the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act,48 and the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act.49 These Acts amended the
respective remedy laws to state explicitly that Congress intended to
abrogate state sovereign immunity and make states subject to the federal
intellectual property laws.50 Courts applying Atascadero found that
Congress had expressed its will with sufficient clarity, and states were
once again subject to infringement suits.51

46. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.7, at 451.
47. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat.
4230 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. and 7 U.S.C.); see S. REP. NO.102-280, at 7
(1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3093 (“To remedy the application of Atascadero
to intellectual property laws, Senator DeConcini introduced S. 758 to explicitly establish that
Congress did intend to subject States to patent infringement suits in Federal court.”).
48. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-282(I), at 2 (1989), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949, 3950 (“While Atascadero was not a copyright case, a number of circuits have
applied its reasoning to the copyright law in deciding that sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs in
copyright infringement suits from recovering money damages from State defendants. . . . The
purpose of H.R. 3045, therefore, is to amend title 17 to clearly and explicitly abrogate State
sovereign immunity to permit the recovery of money damages against States.”).
49. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat 3567 (1992) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see S. REP. NO. 102-280 at 7, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3093 (“To
remedy the application of Atascadero to intellectual property laws, Senator DeConcini introduced S.
758 to explicitly establish that Congress did intend to subject States to patent infringement suits in
Federal court. . . . Similar legislation is required to rectify the inherent inequity plaguing the area of
trademark protection. Accordingly, Senator DeConcini introduced S. 759, the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act.”).
50. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (2000) (patent infringement); 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511
(copyright infringement); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122(b) (trademark infringement).
51. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Univ.
of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996), rev’d on remand, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000)
(copyright and trademark case); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (patent case).
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Seminole Tribe

The validity of the abrogation pursuant to these statutes depended
upon whether Congress had the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Intellectual Property Clause52 (for patents and
copyrights) and the Commerce Clause53 (for trademarks). Based on
Union Gas, Congress seemed to be on safe ground in passing the
Remedy Clarification Acts. That seemingly safe ground disappeared a
few years later with the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida.54 In Seminole Tribe, the Seminole Tribe of
Florida wanted to operate a casino in the state of Florida.55 Pursuant to
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,56 the Tribe attempted to negotiate a
gaming compact with the state.57 When Florida refused to negotiate, in
violation of the statutory requirement that it negotiate such compacts in
good faith, the Tribe followed the procedures laid out in the Act and
sued the state.58 The state filed a motion to dismiss, asserting its
sovereign immunity.59 The district court denied the motion, but was
reversed by the Eleventh Circuit, and the Tribe appealed to the Supreme
Court.60 The Court concluded that Congress had clearly intended to
abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states in the Act, and that it
purported to do so pursuant to its powers under the Indian Commerce
Clause of Article I of the Constitution.61 However, in a five to four vote,
the Court overruled its decision in Union Gas62 and held that Congress
did not have the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under its
Article I powers, including the Indian Commerce Clause.63 The Court
therefore dismissed the suit against Florida on Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity grounds.64
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
55. Id. at 51–52.
56. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994), invalidated in part by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72–73.
57. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51–52.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 52.
60. Id. at 52–53.
61. Id. at 56–57, 60. The Indian Commerce Clause is found at U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
62. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
63. Id. at 72–73.
64. Id. at 73.
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However, Seminole Tribe did not overrule the Court’s prior ruling
that Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under
Section 5 of the later Fourteenth Amendment.65 Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”66
Section 5 further provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”67 The
Court had previously held that the Fourteenth Amendment
fundamentally altered the relationship between the states and the federal
government and gave the federal government a power over the states
that it previously lacked.68 Seminole Tribe did not disturb the Court’s
prior holding that Congress may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity
under Section 5 in order to enforce the individual rights, including
protection of property interests, provided in Section 1.69
The Seminole Tribe also asserted that, even if the state were immune
under the Eleventh Amendment, it could still seek an injunction against
the Governor of Florida in his official capacity pursuant to Ex parte
Young,70 requiring him to negotiate in good faith.71 The Court disagreed.
It analyzed the statutory scheme, which laid out a detailed sequence of
steps for negotiating tribe-state compacts and placed stringent
requirements on suits against the state under the Act.72 The Court stated:
[W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for
the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a
court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and
permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte
Young.73
The Court concluded that the detailed statutory scheme foreclosed the
possibility of other remedies via a suit under Ex parte Young.74 To rule
65. Id. at 59.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
68. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
69. See id.
70. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
71. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73. Ex parte Young suits against state officers acting in their
official capacity are discussed in Part II.B, infra.
72. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73–75.
73. Id. at 74.
74. Id. at 76.
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otherwise, the Court decided, was to invite Indian tribes to evade the
stringent requirements set forth in the statutory scheme by filing suit
directly under Ex parte Young.75
5.

Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank

Seminole Tribe’s overruling of Union Gas raised an obvious question
concerning the constitutionality of the abrogation of state sovereign
immunity in the Remedy Clarification Acts, because in passing them,
Congress relied at least in part on its Article I powers.76 However,
Congress also purported to base those Acts in part on Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which remained a valid ground for abrogating
state sovereign immunity.77 Thus, the validity of the Remedy
Clarification Acts was somewhat in doubt. The Supreme Court resolved
this doubt in a pair of companion cases, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank78 and College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board.79
Both cases stemmed from the state of Florida’s creation of a plan for
prepaying college expenses using a special investment program, under
the authority of the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board (Florida Prepaid).80 College Savings Bank held a patent on a
method of managing such a program.81 College Savings Bank filed two
suits against Florida Prepaid, the first alleging patent infringement82 and
the second alleging that Florida Prepaid had used false advertising in
75. Id. at 75.
76. See S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 7–8 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3093–94
(“The provisions of [the Patent Remedy Clarification Act] are justified under the Patent Clause, the
Commerce Clause and the enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment. [The Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act] is justified under the Commerce Clause and the fourteenth
amendment.”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-282(I), at 7 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3949,
3955 (“Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment has been repeatedly upheld, but in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, the Court held that Congress has the power to abrogate under the
Commerce Clause of Article I. The Committee believes that the Union Gas reasoning applies
equally to the Copyright Clause of Article I.” (footnote omitted)).
77. See S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 7–8, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3093–94; H.R. REP. NO. 101-282(I),
at 7, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3955.
78. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
79. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
80. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631.
81. Id. at 630–31.
82. Id. at 631.
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selling its plan, actionable as unfair competition under the Lanham
Act.83 The district court granted Florida Prepaid’s motion to dismiss the
false advertising claim on grounds of sovereign immunity84 but denied
its motion to dismiss the patent claims.85 College Savings Bank’s appeal
of the false advertising claim went to the Third Circuit, which held that
the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act did not validly abrogate
Florida’s sovereign immunity and affirmed the district court’s ruling that
Florida Prepaid was immune from suit.86 Its appeal of the patent claims
went to the Federal Circuit, which held that the Patent Remedy
Clarification Act did validly abrogate state immunity and affirmed the
district court’s ruling that the suit could proceed.87 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in both cases.
In both cases, the Court held that the respective Remedy Clarification
Acts evinced a clear intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity, as required under Atascadero.88 However, the Court then held
that, under Seminole Tribe, Congress could not validly abrogate the
states’ immunity under its Article I powers, including the Intellectual
Property Clause and the Commerce Clause.89 The remaining issue was
whether Congress appropriately enacted either Act pursuant to Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.90
For the patent claims, the Court concluded that a patent was
“property” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore
Congress could validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity with
“appropriate legislation” if it found that states were depriving
individuals of patent rights without due process of law.91 However, it
83. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 671.
84. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 428 (D.N.J.
1996), aff’d, 131 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’d, 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
85. Id., aff’d, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
86. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 1997).
87. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1346, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
88. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635; College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 670 (noting that
Congress had amended the Lanham Act to apply to states and their officers, and to state that such
parties were not immune under the Eleventh Amendment). The Court did not explicitly address the
“clear intent” prong of Atascadero in College Savings Bank; however, it did address the issue of
Congressional power to enact the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, which inquiry would have
been unnecessary unless the threshold requirement of clear intent had been met. See id. at 672–75.
89. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635–36; College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 672.
90. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635–36; College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 672.
91. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637, 641–42.
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noted that its prior rulings established that “for Congress to invoke § 5, it
must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to
remedying or preventing such conduct.”92 The Court first looked to
identify the “‘evil’ or ‘wrong’ that Congress intended to remedy,” and
concluded that the record Congress compiled in the course of enacting
the Patent Remedy Clarification Act did not support its contention that
any such wrong was occurring.93 In particular, the Court stated, “[i]n
enacting the Patent Remedy Act . . . Congress identified no pattern of
patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations.”94 It noted that the record contained no evidence showing
widespread, unremedied infringement by the states.95 In the absence of
such a showing, the legislation was not an “appropriate” exercise of
Congress’s Section 5 powers.96
Turning to the question of whether individuals were being deprived of
their patent property rights without due process, the Court emphasized
that mere deprivation was not enough—the deprivation had to be done
without due process of law.97 Thus, “only where the State provides no
remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its
infringement of their patent could a deprivation of property without due
process result.”98 The Court then noted that “Congress, however, barely
considered the availability of state remedies for patent infringement and
hence whether the States’ conduct might have amounted to a
constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.”99 The Court
further observed that it had previously held that a “state actor’s negligent
act that causes unintended injury to a person’s property does not
‘deprive’ that person of property within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause”—some sort of intentional or reckless action is required.100
However, proving patent infringement required no such showing of an
92. Id. at 639. As discussed in the Court’s opinion, see id. at 637–39, this “congruence and
proportionality” test has its origins in the Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
519–20 (1997).
93. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639–40.
94. Id. at 640.
95. Id. at 640–41.
96. Id. at 645–46.
97. Id. at 642–43.
98. Id. at 643.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 645.
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intent to infringe, and thus many patent infringements by states would
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.101 In light of the
absence of proof that violations were widespread and that state law
provided no remedy for such violations, the Court found that the broad
abrogation remedy provided by the Act was far out of proportion to the
harm it was supposed to redress:
Despite subjecting States to this expansive liability, Congress
did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving
arguable constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses
to offer any state-court remedy for patent owners whose patents
it had infringed. Nor did it make any attempt to confine the
reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of
infringement, such as nonnegligent infringement or infringement
authorized pursuant to state policy; or providing for suits only
against States with questionable remedies or a high incidence of
infringement.102
The Court therefore concluded that the Act was not a proper exercise of
Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
invalidated the Act.103 Because the Act was invalid, Florida Prepaid
retained its immunity.104
For the false advertising claim, the Court found that College Savings
Bank had no “property” right to be free of false advertising, and
therefore Section 5 did not apply, leaving Congress without power to
abrogate state immunity.105 It also held that Florida had neither explicitly
nor implicitly waived its sovereign immunity when it entered the
commercial realm by forming Florida Prepaid.106 Thus, the Court found
Florida Prepaid immune from suit on both causes of action.107
By its terms, Florida Prepaid invalidated only the Patent Remedy
Clarification Act.108 Similarly, College Savings Bank invalidated the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act only insofar as it applied to false
101. Id.
102. Id. at 646–47.
103. Id. at 647–48. Because it is couched in terms of the adequacy of the record, the Court’s
reasoning appears to leave open the possibility that Congress could at some point, on a proper
record, enact such a remedy for unconstitutional patent violations.
104. Id.
105. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672–75 (1999).
106. Id. at 675–87.
107. Id. at 672–75; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647–48.
108. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647–48.
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advertising claims;109 the Court did not address its application to actual
trademark claims. However, the logic of the decisions indicated that the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act were similarly invalid. This indication was
subsequently confirmed when the Fifth Circuit invalidated both the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act in Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,110 following the logic
of Florida Prepaid in determining that Congress had exceeded its
powers under Article I and had failed to make an adequate case under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.111
Thus, all three Remedy Clarification Acts have been nullified.112 As a
consequence, states are currently immune from suits in federal court
under the federal intellectual property laws. Furthermore, because the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright
suits,113 states are effectively immune from any suit for patent or
copyright infringement.
6.

Efforts to Overcome Florida Prepaid

Many commentators and legislators have expressed concern over this
outcome, and have therefore proposed various possible ways to use other
powers to restore state liability for intellectual property infringements.114
109. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 668–69, 691; see also id. at 673 (“The Lanham Act may
well contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property interests—notably, its
provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the ‘property’ of the owner because
he can exclude others from using them. The Lanham Act’s false-advertising provisions, however,
bear no relationship to any right to exclude . . . .” (citations omitted)).
110. 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
111. Id. at 603–08.
112. Technically, because the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act, each circuit is entitled to decide the issue of the validity of that Act for
itself. However, the decision in Chavez follows so directly from Florida Prepaid and College
Savings Bank (and even Seminole Tribe standing alone) that no circuit is likely to disagree.
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent,
plant variety protection and copyright cases.”).
114. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13; Berman et al., supra note 13; Robert T. Neufeld, Closing
Federalism’s Loophole in Intellectual Property Rights, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1295 (2002);
Jennifer Cotner, Note, How the Spending Clause Can Solve the Dilemma of State Sovereign
Immunity from Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DUKE L.J. 713 (2001). Professor Eugene Volokh
offers a counterargument that the Florida Prepaid regime may not be as unjust as it appears. Eugene
Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161 (2000). He notes
that the standard analogy is that an infringing state should be treated no differently from an
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Some have suggested that Congress could use its spending power to
restore this liability. In South Dakota v. Dole,115 the Supreme Court
ruled that the spending clause gave Congress the power to use the grant
or withholding of federal funds to encourage behavior by the states that
it could not otherwise compel.116 Commentators have suggested that
Congress could threaten to withhold some portion of the state’s funding,
such as its research funding, unless the state waived its immunity from
suit for intellectual property infringements.117 As a variant on this theme,
commentators have suggested that Congress could deny a state
protection for its own intellectual property unless it waived its immunity
from suit by other intellectual property holders.118
Alternatively, Congress might be able to create state liability by
relying on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s
decisions did not foreclose the possibility of this approach, at least for
intellectual property rights that meet the Court’s definition of “property,”
but merely indicated that Congress had not met its burden of showing
that state intellectual property infringements were sufficiently
widespread and harmful to justify the extremely broad remedy set forth
in the Remedy Clarification Acts.119 Thus, one way to render the states
liable would be for Congress to collect sufficient data to meet the

infringing private entity, id. at 1161–62, then offers two competing analogies. First, state sovereign
immunity effectively puts the states on the same footing as the federal government, in that they are
now free to infringe as long as they pay just compensation. Id. at 1162–67. Second, immunity from
intellectual property infringement puts intellectual property on the same footing as tangible
property, because the states are allowed to use tangible property as long as they pay just
compensation. Id. at 1167–70. He notes in conclusion: “Readers can decide for themselves which of
these analogies is more persuasive; I’m frankly not sure. But at least the existence of the latter
analogies should caution us against being too quick or too heated in pragmatic or moral
condemnation of the Court’s decisions.” Id. at 1170.
115. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
116. Id. at 211–12. In Dole, the threat was to withhold five percent of federal highway funds if a
state did not raise its drinking age to twenty-one. Id. at 205, 211 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 158).
117. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1373–80; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1132–46;
Cotner, supra note 114, at 740–41.
118. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1380–89; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1146–66;
Cotner, supra note 114, at 724–40. Because state universities do considerable patenting pursuant to
the Bayh-Dole Act, and a few of them have made significant profits off their patents, denying them
such a right is a valid threat. See infra notes 450–52 and accompanying text. However, given the
relatively small revenue gained by most states and the potentially large liability for intellectual
property infringements, one commentator has speculated that the states are more likely to give up
their own right to obtain intellectual property rather than to submit to suits for infringement. See
Neufeld, supra note 114, at 1323–24.
119. See Fla. Prepaid Secondary Educ. Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635–48 (1999).
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burden.120 This data would need to show that intentional intellectual
property infringement by states was widespread and that state remedies
were inadequate to redress the harm to the intellectual property
holders.121 However, such data is, at least at the current time, difficult to
obtain (although the immunity provided under Florida Prepaid might
make its availability more likely in the future).122 Alternatively,
Congress could draft narrower legislation tailored to address only actual
constitutional harms.123 This legislation could make states liable only in
circumstances in which the infringement was deliberate and state
remedies had already proved insufficient.124 Such limited legislation
would almost certainly pass constitutional muster, although the
protection it ultimately provided might be narrower than that provided
by the intellectual property regimes themselves.125
Finally, commentators have proposed relying on a type of suit in
which states may not assert sovereign immunity: suits brought by the
United States.126 Because the United States is the overarching sovereign,
the Supreme Court has held that states are not immune to suits by the
United States itself, and that Congress may authorize suits in the name
of the United States to enforce federal law.127 A variation of this
proposal is for the United States to authorize qui tam actions for
intellectual property infringements, in which the intellectual property
holder is given permission to sue in the name of the United States and
keep some or all of the recovery.128 However, these proposals have

120. See, e.g., Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1074–83.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1083.
123. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1344–57; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1083–1109;
Cotner, supra note 114, at 745–51.
124. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1344–46; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1083–86.
125. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1347–57; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1086–1109.
126. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1362–73; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1115–21;
Cotner, supra note 114, at 744–45.
127. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1362 (“It is well established that states have no
immunity from suit by the United States. It is equally well established that Congress may authorize
the United States to bring suit to enforce federal law, whether or not the United States claims a
proprietary interest in the outcome.” (citing United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965);
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 641–45
(1892)) (footnotes omitted)); Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1115–16.
128. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1365–71; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1117–20.
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serious practical and constitutional problems that make them unlikely to
be effective general solutions.129
Nonetheless, suits by the federal government might be effective in a
particular class of cases: Those involving foreign holders of U.S.
intellectual property rights. Pursuant to various international agreements
and treaties, the United States has a duty to provide remedies to foreign
nationals who hold U.S. intellectual property rights.130 State sovereign
immunity at least arguably puts the United States out of compliance with
those agreements, insofar as no remedy is available against infringing
states.131 Because the class of state infringements of intellectual property
rights held by foreign nationals is likely to be small, suits by the United
States may be a practical method for bringing the United States into
compliance with its international obligations.132
Various bills proposing versions of these remedies have been
introduced into Congress. For example, shortly after the Florida Prepaid
decision, Senator Leahy introduced the Intellectual Property Protection
Restoration Act of 1999.133 This bill would have implemented a remedy
tailored to the violations defined in Section 1 and enforced in Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and conditioned a state’s ability to obtain
intellectual property rights on its opting into the federal intellectual
property systems by waiving its immunity to suits by other intellectual
property holders.134 Subsequent bills introduced into both the House and
129. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1362–64 (noting the costly and difficult decision that the
government would have to make about when to intervene on behalf of an intellectual property
holder attempting to sue a state); id. at 1365–71 (discussing the qui tam proposal and noting that it
may well fail to pass constitutional muster); Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1117 (noting the
“practical and political” difficulties of having the United States involved in every infringement suit
against the states); id. at 1117–20 (discussing the qui tam proposal and noting that the Supreme
Court is likely to invalidate it as an illegitimate trick to evade the strictures of Seminole Tribe).
Professor Meltzer also discusses a “hybrid” scheme in which the United States intervenes only
when a court has found a state guilty of infringement (via an Ex parte Young official capacity suit or
a personal capacity suit), and the United States seeks a civil fine, to be paid eventually to the
patentee. See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1370–73.
130. See Menell, supra note 13, at 1449–64. Professor Menell also discusses the possibility of
relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause via these treaty obligations for power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. See id. at 1460–64.
131. See id. at 1449.
132. See Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1194–95.
133. S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1999). The provisions of this bill are analyzed extensively in Berman
et al., supra note 13, passim.
134. See S. 1835 § 111 (“No State or any instrumentality of that State may acquire a Federal
intellectual property right unless the State opts into the Federal intellectual property system. . . . A
State opts into the Federal intellectual property system by providing an assurance [of] the State's
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Senate—the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Acts of 2001,135
2002,136 and 2003137—would have implemented an alternative reform.
These bills proposed to: (1) deny remedies for intellectual property
infringements for any patent, copyright, or trademark that was at any
time owned by a state, unless that state had waived its sovereign
immunity;138 (2) make all remedies available against private infringers
also available against state officers and employees;139 and (3) make
directly actionable all intellectual property violations that do not comply
with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment or that
effect a taking under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.140 However,
to date, no relevant changes have been enacted.
As an alternative to a change in federal law, some commentators have
noted that state law may be able to partially fill the gaps in state liability
for intellectual property infringement that Florida Prepaid created,
albeit in a more limited way.141 Most states have a constitutional clause
or a statute with effect similar to that of the Fifth Amendment’s takings
clause. Such provisions might be used to file a suit against the state in
state court, characterizing the intellectual property infringement as a
taking of the intellectual property.142 Finally, some commentators have
argued that the result in Florida Prepaid will have very little practical
effect, because of other structural and political restraints on the states.143
The Eleventh Amendment bans suits in federal court against a state
by citizens of another state. In Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court held
that this Eleventh Amendment ban applies to patent infringement claims
against states, and subsequent lower court cases have expanded that ban
agreement to waive sovereign immunity from suit in Federal court in any action against the State or
any instrumentality or official of that State—(1) arising under a Federal intellectual property law; or
(2) seeking a declaration with respect to a Federal intellectual property right.”).
135. S. 1611, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3204, 107th Cong. (2001).
136. S. 2031, 107th Cong. (2002). The provisions of a draft of this bill are analyzed in Neufeld,
supra note 114, at 1312–28.
137. S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2344, 108th Cong. (2003).
138. See, e.g., S. 1191 § 3.
139. See, e.g., id. § 4.
140. See, e.g., id. § 5.
141. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 13, at 1413–28; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1109–14.
142. These ideas are explored in much greater depth in the cited references, and are largely
beyond the scope of this article.
143. See generally Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment?
The Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2006)
(discussing generally the limited impact of state sovereign immunity); Menell, supra note 13.

298

PULSINELLI.DOC

5/22/2007 7:47:14 PM

Freedom to Explore
to other areas of federal intellectual property law. To date, legislative
efforts to limit Florida Prepaid have been unsuccessful, and other
proposed remedial avenues remain largely untested. Thus, Florida
Prepaid is still the governing law: States are immune from suits for
intellectual property infringements.
II.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF STATE UNIVERSITY
RESEARCHERS UNDER FLORIDA PREPAID

Although much commentary has focused on how to “fix” Florida
Prepaid and make states liable for intellectual property infringement,
very little direct attention has been focused on the status of individual
state employees in the post-Florida Prepaid world, and how they might
be affected by state immunity for intellectual property infringement.
This Article attempts to address that deficit, at least for a particular class
of defendants. Researchers at state universities, like Dr. Little, whose
research may lead them to use—deliberately or inadvertently—
techniques or materials that are covered by patents or copyrights,
comprise one of the most likely classes of infringers. The remainder of
this Article will discuss the liability of researchers at state universities
for infringement of patents and copyrights.144 This Part discusses the
possible avenues by which an intellectual property holder might pursue
an action against researchers at state universities, along with difficulties
presented by these avenues. The following two Parts then focus on a
qualified immunity defense that the researchers at state universities
should be able to assert in response.
Unfortunately, at present there is no clear body of law defining the
liability of such researchers. Virtually all law pertaining to sovereign
immunity, particularly for state employees, has arisen in the context of
civil rights litigation. Thus, much of what follows is argued by analogy
to that body of law. Whether that analogy is apt is open to reasonable
debate. However, I will attempt to justify it at the relevant points in the
following discussion, and also indicate where it might not be a good fit.
This Part examines the potential liability of researchers at state
universities for patent and copyright infringement. Part II.A notes that
the universities themselves, as branches of the state, are almost certainly
immune from damages liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Part
144. While such researchers might theoretically also infringe trademarks, I consider the
probability of their doing so—and more importantly, their need to do so in furtherance of their
research—sufficiently remote that I do not address it.
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II.B then examines the liability of researchers at state universities under
the doctrine of Ex parte Young, which permits proceedings for injunctive
relief against state officials in their official capacities. It notes that such
proceedings are typically permitted despite the Eleventh Amendment,
but that such suits may be precluded in the intellectual property context.
This Part also examines the utility of such suits from the perspective of
the intellectual property holder and their impact on the research process
from the perspective of researchers at state universities. Finally, Part II.C
discusses the possibility of suits for money damages against researchers
at state universities in their personal capacities and the potential harms
of such suits.
A.

Immunity for State Universities

Under Florida Prepaid’s reasoning, a state itself cannot be sued for
patent or copyright infringement, which raises the issue of how far and
to whom that Eleventh Amendment immunity extends. In general, courts
have held that branches of the state are protected under the umbrella of
the state’s sovereign immunity.145 Courts have also held that state
universities are branches of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity
and thus have granted immunity to state universities.146 Therefore, patent
and copyright holders will not be able to sue the university directly for
intellectual property infringement.147

145. See 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.01[D], at 2-61 to 2-70 (listing branches of the
state that have been granted immunity and collecting cases).
146. See id. at 2-63 & n.197 (collecting cases).
147. See, e.g., Xechem Int’l, Inc. v. Univ. Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324,
1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The University of Texas is deemed to be an arm of the State of Texas,
and Xechem does not dispute that the University is properly accorded Eleventh Amendment
immunity [from suit for damages for patent infringement].” (citations omitted)); BV Eng’g v. Univ.
Cal., L.A., 858 F.2d 1394, 1395 (9th Cir.1988) (“The University of California and the Board of
Regents are considered to be instrumentalities of the state, and therefore enjoy the same immunity
as the state of California [from suit for damages for copyright infringement].” (internal quotation
and citation omitted)); Kersavage v. Univ. Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (“No
question is raised by the parties that the University of Tennessee is an arm of the State of
Tennessee; this is now well-settled law. Consequently, the University may invoke the Eleventh
Amendment to bar a suit against it for damages [for patent infringement].” (citations omitted)). But
see ELEVENTH AMENDMENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 36, at 8 (“[S]ome
Pennsylvania universities generally considered to be public institutions are only quasi-state entities
for litigation purposes and do not have immunity in federal courts.”).
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B.

Suits Pursuant to Ex Parte Young

1.

The Ex Parte Young Doctrine

Because states and branches of the state enjoy such broad immunity
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has developed a
variety of doctrines that afford plaintiffs at least some relief.148 One of
the most important of these is the doctrine set forth in the Supreme
Court’s 1908 ruling in Ex parte Young.149 In Ex parte Young, the Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition of suits in federal courts
against states did not preclude proceedings against state officials who are
acting in their official capacity.150 The rationale (some have called it a
fiction151) behind this ruling was that state law could not grant an official
the authority to violate the Constitution or federal law, and therefore the
state’s sovereign immunity should not shield the official from all
liability when such a violation took place.152 Thus, while a suit for patent
or copyright infringement against a state or state university would be
dismissed on immunity grounds, proceedings against a particular
researcher in his or her official capacity (that is, as a researcher at the
state university) would not be.
However, the doctrine of Ex parte Young has a very important
limitation: Plaintiffs are permitted to request only injunctive relief, and
are not permitted to sue for monetary damages.153 That is, prospective
relief is available, but retrospective damages are not. The line between
148. The most important of these are the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which
permits proceedings for injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities, the subject
of Part II.B, and the doctrine that permits suits for money damages against state officials in their
personal capacities, the subject of Part II.C. In addition, the Court has permitted suits by the federal
government against unconsenting states, suits in admiralty, and suits pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.4, at 412–13. The Court has
also permitted suits against cities and other municipal entities. See id. at 413–14. The court has
further held that states may explicitly waive their immunity. See id. § 7.6.
149. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
150. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.5.1, at 419–20.
151. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997) (referring to the Ex parte
Young exception as “an obvious fiction”); Choper & Yoo, supra note 143, at 225 (noting that Ex
parte Young is “[w]idely recognized to have relied on a legal fiction”).
152. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159–60. For discussion, criticism, and defense of Ex parte
Young, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.5.1, at 419–22.
153. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–71 (1974) (articulating the distinction between
the two forms of relief). “The seminal case articulating the distinction between retroactive and
prospective relief is Edelman v. Jordan.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.5.2, at 425.
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the two is not always easy to draw,154 particularly in civil rights cases,
because of the wide range of forms that the injunction can take.155
However, that issue should not create much of a problem with
intellectual property cases, where the injunction typically is limited to
halting future infringements. Thus, in a proceeding against the state
researcher in his or her official capacity, the plaintiff could request only
an injunction against further infringement, and not damages for past
infringement. As one exception, in an appropriate case under Ex parte
Young, the successful plaintiff is permitted to recover attorney fees
incurred in the proceeding itself.156 Such fees are not deemed to be
retroactive damages for past harms, but rather costs of obtaining the
prospective relief.157 In civil rights cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, these fees are typically awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.158 In
the intellectual property area, attorney fees are also available under the
respective Acts,159 and so may be awarded in appropriate cases.
While the Ex parte Young doctrine is well established in the civil
rights context, the doctrine may not apply in the patent and copyright
infringement contexts. As discussed above,160 the Supreme Court in
Seminole Tribe held that proceedings under Ex parte Young may be
precluded where the statutory scheme itself contains a detailed remedial
scheme against the states.161 That description certainly applies to patent

154. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667 (“As in most areas of the law, the difference between the
type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not
in many instances be that between day and night.”).
155. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288–90 (1977) (discussing whether a
desegregation plan calling for several remedial and compensatory education programs provided
relief that was prospective or retrospective); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.5.2, at 426–
27 (discussing the difficulty in making the prospective/retroactive distinction in cases like Milliken
(citing David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 SUP. CT.
REV. 149, 162 (criticizing the Court’s conclusion in Milliken that the relief was prospective))); 1
COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.01[C], at 2-34 to 2-36 (discussing Milliken).
156. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.5.2, at 427 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978)).
157. See id.
158. Suits under § 1983 are discussed infra Part III.A.
159. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (patent law) (“The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000) (copyright law) (“Except
as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the
prevailing party as part of the costs.”).
160. See supra Part I.B.4.
161. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73–76 (1996); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 22, § 7.5, at 434–36 (discussing this aspect of Seminole Tribe).
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and copyright law, both of which spell out the available remedies in
great detail.162 Furthermore, Congress made these remedies specifically
applicable to the states in the Remedy Clarification Acts.163 Under
Seminole Tribe, these features may be enough to preclude Ex parte
Young proceedings for injunctive relief in intellectual property cases.164
However, courts may be reluctant to extend Seminole Tribe so far as
to preclude such proceedings. In that decision, the remedy provided
could apply only to the states,165 and it was less than what would have
been available in a suit under Ex parte Young.166 In Seminole Tribe, the
Court was reluctant to allow plaintiffs to pursue a broader cause of
action under Ex parte Young and thereby upset the statutory scheme by
avoiding the complex and specific limitations of the statute.167 Under
patent and copyright law, in contrast, the statutory remedies are
applicable to everyone,168 and they are much greater than would be
allowed under Ex parte Young,169 thus avoiding the problems that
concerned the Court in Seminole Tribe.
162. See 35 U.S.C. ch. 29 (“Remedies for Infringement of Patent, and Other Actions”); 17 U.S.C.
ch. 5 (“Copyright Infringement and Remedies”)
163. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (patent cases); 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511 (copyright cases).
164. See Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amendment and UniversityPrivate Sector Intellectual Property Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1487–88 (2000)
(noting this issue).
165. The statute at issue, § 2710(d) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)
(1994), lays out the procedure for Indian tribes and states to enter into gaming compacts permitting
the tribes to run gambling games on tribal land located within the state. The statute requires the state
to negotiate such compacts, and to negotiate them in good faith. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48–50.
In the words of the Court,
[W]here the court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith, the only remedy
prescribed is an order directing the State and the Indian tribe to conclude a compact within 60
days. And if the parties disregard the court’s order and fail to conclude a compact within the
60-day period, the only sanction is that each party then must submit a proposed compact to a
mediator who selects the one which best embodies the terms of the Act. Finally, if the State
fails to accept the compact selected by the mediator, the only sanction against it is that the
mediator shall notify the Secretary of the Interior who then must prescribe regulations
governing class III gaming on the tribal lands at issue.
Id. at 74–75.
166. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75–76.
167. See id.
168. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.” (emphasis added)); 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright . . . .” (emphasis added)).
169. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (providing for injunctions and damages, respectively, for
patent infringement); 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (providing for injunctions and damages, respectively,
for copyright infringement).
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Furthermore, holding that the detailed remedial schemes of the patent
and copyright acts preclude relief under Ex parte Young would have a
paradoxical effect. In its failed attempt to defeat sovereign immunity and
make states liable for infringement in the Remedy Clarification Acts,
Congress would have created a remedial system specifically applicable
to the states. Under a strict reading of Seminole Tribe, making the
remedial scheme apply to the states would preclude proceedings for
injunctive relief under Ex parte Young. Thus, in trying to make states
completely liable, Congress would have not only failed in that effort, but
it would have also destroyed one of the limited avenues of relief that
would otherwise have been available against states. Clearly, this result
could not be what Congress intended. Because the concerns that led to
the result in Seminole Tribe—relief that applied only to the state and that
was narrower than that available under Ex parte Young—are not really
implicated in suits for patent or copyright infringement, courts are
unlikely to reach this result. Thus, individual researchers at state
universities are likely at risk for injunctions in their official capacities
under Ex parte Young.
2.

Value of Ex Parte Young Injunctions to the Intellectual Property
Owner

Whether pursuing Ex parte Young injunctions is worthwhile to
patentees is a separate question. Patentees will need to decide whether a
proceeding that can yield only an injunction, but no damages, will
accomplish their goals. On the one hand, the lack of damages may make
the suit a poor investment. Patent litigation is very expensive, and
limiting the potential reward for victory to an injunction may provide
insufficient motivation to proceed.170 The availability of damages at the
end of the suit may be economically necessary to make the suit viable,
and their absence may effectively discourage infringement suits.171 From
the standpoint of the researcher, this outcome is, of course, the ideal
result—he or she is effectively able to ride on the coattails of the state’s
170. See Bone, supra note 164, at 1486 (“Indeed, given the risks and expense of litigation, a
rational plaintiff might even conclude that filing suit solely to obtain an injunction is not worth the
costs.”); ELEVENTH AMENDMENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 36, at 24 (“An
injunction in federal court is not an answer, [surveyed members of the intellectual property
community] say, because it would not result in an award of damages and the litigation necessary to
obtain the injunction could itself be expensive and protracted.”).
171. See Bone, supra note 164, at 1485–86 (discussing this problem generally and concluding
“[h]ence, the injunction remedy is inadequate standing alone”).
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immunity and avoid suit for infringement, by virtue of his or her status
as a researcher at a state university.
On the other hand, the unavailability of damages may be of little
significance to the patentee in the context of researchers at state
universities. First, the potential damages available might themselves be
sufficiently minimal that they would not affect the patentee’s decision as
to whether or not to file suit. For patent law, the available damages
would be either the patentee’s lost profits or else a reasonable royalty for
the infringement.172 Implicit in both remedies is an assumption of
commercial activity on the part of the infringer that takes sales from the
patentee (if the infringer is a competitor) or results in sales by the
infringer, some part of which are due to the infringement and for which
the patentee should be compensated (if the infringer is in a different
market).173 However, direct commercial activity of this nature is
generally not a part of academic research or teaching.174 Dr. Little is not
selling anything; she is merely trying to make animal cloning more
efficient. The patentee is unlikely to have lost any sales other than ones
that could have been made directly to the researcher, or to have lost out
on any royalty other than the one that could have been made on such a
sale. These losses are quite likely small, and their presence (or absence)
is unlikely to influence the patentee’s calculus on whether to file suit.
A similar analysis pertains to copyright, but with a few twists. Unlike
patent law, copyright law permits recovery of the infringer’s profits, in
addition to recovery for the copyright holder’s lost profits.175 However,
the non-commercial context will again make such profits unlikely. More
important is the issue of statutory damages.176 The Copyright Act
specifically provides for monetary damages for infringement, regardless

172. See 35 U.S.C. § 284; see also, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575
F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978) (interpreting § 284).
173. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549, 1554–55 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (awarding damages for both types of commercial activity).
174. Modern academic research is frequently sponsored, at least in part by commercial entities,
which raises certain issues if the researchers are granted absolute immunity. See infra Part V.D.
However, for purposes of the present discussion, the focus is on basic research that is not directly
commercial, in the sense that it very rarely involves any kind of direct sales from the researcher to
other entities, the type of conduct that damages would normally be expected to redress.
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages
suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement . . . .” (emphasis added)).
176. See id. § 504(c) (spelling out the requirements and amounts of statutory damages).
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of actual loss to the copyright holder or gain to the infringer.177 In a
given case, these statutory damages might provide the incentive for a
suit, and thus their absence in an Ex parte Young suit might diminish the
copyright holder’s interest in filing a suit.
The availability of attorney fees further complicates the analysis.
Even if damages are not awarded, attorney fees might be,178 and the
possibility of such an award may make the proceeding worthwhile for
the intellectual property holder. However, in patent suits, attorney fees
are only available in “exceptional cases.”179 In practice, this normally
means the plaintiff can only get fees for either litigation misconduct
(which cannot be predicted in advance and thus cannot affect the
patentee’s decision on whether or not to file suit) or willful
infringement.180 Although the statutory language in the Copyright Act is
different (fees are left to the discretion of the district court),181 in practice
the situation is quite similar—the plaintiff is awarded attorney fees for
litigation misconduct and/or willful infringement.182 Thus, in both cases,
the award of attorney fees will largely turn on whether the infringement
was willful. Willful infringement and its relationship to state sovereign
immunity are discussed in detail below in Part IV.B.
Second, damages are frequently not the primary goal of an
infringement suit. Often, what the patentee seeks is an injunction against
future infringement,183 so that it can drive the competing infringer out of
the market and thereby increase its profits. As noted above, such
competitive commercial motivation is typically lacking in the research
177. See id. § 504(a)(2), (c).
178. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (providing for attorney fees in patent cases); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (providing
for attorney fees in copyright cases).
179. See 35 U.S.C. § 285.
180. See 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[4][c][iii] (1999) [hereinafter
CHISUM ON PATENTS] (discussing attorney fees for prevailing patentees and collecting cases).
181. See 17 U.S.C. § 505.
182. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT 604–12 (7th ed.
2006); see generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.10
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (discussing the award of attorney fees in copyright cases).
183. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (providing for injunctions in patent cases); see also ROBERT PATRICK
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1039 (3d
ed. 2002) (“[C]ompensation for past infringement in the form of damages is an important
component of the patentee’s relief. But perhaps a more important remedy from the patentee’s point
of view is the right to enjoin the defendant-infringer from continuing infringing activities.”);
KIMBERLY A. MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL, & RAPHAEL V. LUPO, PATENT LITIGATION AND
STRATEGY 544 (2d ed. 2003) (“[I]njunctive relief is often more valuable to a patent owner than the
monetary damages she can recover from a defendant.”).
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and teaching context. But driving out competitors is not the only
possible motivation for seeking an injunction. Even if damages for past
infringement are unavailable under Ex parte Young, the patentee might
wish to force the researcher to enter into a licensing agreement to pay
royalties for future uses of the patented technology. An injunction
against future infringement may well force the researcher to negotiate
with the patentee for a licensing deal.184 Alternatively, the patentee may
simply want to stop the researcher’s work because it lies in a direction
that the patentee itself wishes to pursue. Normally, the patent would
protect the patentee against such competition, and an injunction
proceeding pursuant to Ex parte Young would restore that right. An
injunction against the infringer will usually shut down the research, at
least for some time. Finally, the unavailibility of damages under Ex
parte Young may be irrelevant if damages are available through suits
against researchers in their personal capacities.185
3.

Harm of Ex Parte Young Suits to the Researcher

Even though the patentee’s remedies are limited to injunctive relief in
a proceeding under Ex parte Young, that form of relief can still be
devastating to a researcher.186 If the patented technology is at all
important to the research project, then an injunction against infringement
will bring the research to a halt. A successful patent proceeding pursuant
to Ex parte Young that results in an injunction against even one small but
crucial step in, for example, Dr. Little’s cloning procedure will render
her completely unable to perform further research into that procedure. A
researcher in this position will be forced to lose valuable time finding a
way to work around the injunction, perhaps by designing around the
patent, or using a technique that is less effective. The use of these workarounds may seriously diminish the quality of the research results or
make the research more time-consuming.

184. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 183, at 1067 (“The bottom line for infringers [subject to
an injunction] is that they will be excluded from further infringement. If they want to continue their
activities, they must bargain with the [intellectual property] right holder.”). An injunction could also
itself require the researcher to pay royalties for continued use. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Mach. &
Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974).
185. Personal capacity suits for damages are discussed infra Part II.C.
186. The direct harm to the researcher is largely the same whether the patent in question is valid
or invalid. The harm to society is much greater if an improperly granted patent is nonetheless upheld
by the court, and therefore blocks off further research that should have been allowed to proceed.
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In some cases, the patentee might be willing to grant the researcher a
license to the patented technology. However, a researcher facing a
possible injunction is in a very difficult bargaining position.187 The
patentee may demand a high price for the license, forcing the researcher
to find the funds to pay the licensing fee. At best, such payments will
divert that money from funding further research. If such fees are not
provided for in the grant funding the research, however, the researcher
may simply be unable to requisition the funds to pay the fees.188 Even
this assumes that the researcher is willing to consider paying a licensing
fee. Many researchers performing basic research189 share Dr. Little’s
view that any such license to use a technique in the pursuit of basic
research is contrary to the fundamental culture of science. Under this
view, basic research is a cooperative endeavor to unravel the secrets of
nature,190 and so scientists should freely share their tools with other
scientists, in the interest of the joint endeavor. This sentiment is
particularly strong among basic researchers. Indeed, Dr. Little feels so
187. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 336 (4th ed. 2006) (“To the extent that a rightholder will
consider negotiating a license with the infringer, the threat of an injunction will heavily influence
the terms of the license. Specifically, it allows the rightholder to set her own price for the injury.”).
188. Federal research grants typically spell out precisely what is to be done with the funds
received, with very little room for diversion to other purposes (indeed, such a diversion would in
many cases be illegal). For example, the National Institutes of Health Grants Policy Statement’s
section on Selected Items of Cost states:
Invention, Patent, or Licensing Costs: Unallowable as a direct cost unless specifically
authorized on the grant award. May be allowable as F&A [Facilities and Administrative (i.e.,
overhead)] costs, provided they are authorized under applicable cost principles and are
included in the negotiation of F&A cost rates. Such costs include licensing or option fees . . . .
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT 92 (2003), available at
http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2003/nihgps_2003.pdf; see also id. at 136–39
(discussing “Enforcement Actions” and stating that “[a] grantee’s failure to comply with the terms
and conditions of award . . . may cause NIH to take one or more enforcement actions, depending on
the severity and duration of the non-compliance.”).
189. As noted earlier, I use the term “basic research” to refer to research into fundamental
scientific problems that do not have direct commercial application, in contrast to “applied research”
into practical problems with direct commercial application. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 178 n.1
(providing a similar definition, but also noting the difficulties of making the distinction in many
contexts).
190. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 6; Rai, supra note 7. Not everyone agrees with this
picture of the scientific enterprise. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research:
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 691 (2001) (arguing that this view of science is too abstract to be of use in setting patent
policy). But see generally Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property
Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707 (2001) (countering Kieff by arguing that scientific
norms are instructive in encouraging patents).
IN THE
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strongly about this issue that under no circumstances would she agree to
license the underlying technology needed in her basic research. Thus,
even when the patentee is amenable to a license, the researcher may not
be, and so an injunction may still adversely affect the research. Finally,
in extreme cases, where no work-around is available and the patentee is
unwilling to grant a license, the research may need to be stopped
altogether, putting the researcher (and the university) in the very difficult
position of being unable to complete research funded by a government
grant.
4.

Limitations on Injunctive Relief

One further wrinkle arises from limiting available remedies to
injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is equitable in nature, meaning that its
award is at the discretion of the court. In general, in deciding whether to
issue an injunction, a court applies a four-factor test:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4)
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction. The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive
relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court,
reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.191
Essentially, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it has sustained an
irreparable injury that cannot be adequately remedied with monetary
damages.192 The court must balance the harm to the patentee if the
injunction is denied against the harm to the infringer if it is allowed.193
The court must also take into consideration the public interest.194
However, until recently, this analysis of eligibility for injunctive relief
was more theoretical than actual for patent cases. The Federal Circuit
established a rule for patent cases that, absent exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances, an injunction should issue as a matter of
course—and it took the word “extraordinary” very seriously.195 The
191. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange II), 401 F.3d 1323, 1339
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result of this rule was that denial of an injunction in a successful patent
suit was extremely rare.196 However, the Supreme Court recently
addressed this rule in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.197
In eBay, the district court had found eBay guilty of infringing
MercExchange’s patent but it declined to grant injunctive relief, citing
the facts that MercExchange was already willingly licensing its patents
and was not itself practicing its patents.198 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the judgment of infringement.199 However, it reversed on the
remedy and ordered the district court to grant the permanent injunction,
citing its “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions
against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”200 On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit decision. In a
brief opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court held that patent
cases were subject to the same rules as all other cases, and courts should
apply the same four-factor test for injunctive relief applied in other
contexts.201 However, it did agree with the Federal Circuit that the
circumstances cited by the district court (non-practicing patentee willing
to license) did not preclude injunctive relief, but that these
circumstances were merely facts to be considered in applying the test.202

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court’s denial of a permanent injunction after a finding of
infringement, stating “[w]e therefore see no reason to depart from the general rule that courts will
issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”), rev’d,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). See generally 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 180, § 20.04[2]
(discussing permanent injunctions and collecting cases).
196. See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 183, at 1062–64 (discussing the extreme rarity of a
denial of a permanent injunction in patent cases); MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 187, at
340–41 (same).
197. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
198. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (MercExchange I), 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 710–15 (E.D.
Va. 2003), rev’d, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). The court also
noted that “[t]his case has been one of the more, if not the most, contentious cases that this court has
ever presided over. From day one the parties have been unable to agree on anything, in fact, the only
agreed stipulation at trial was that this court had subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 714. The court
further expressed its concern that, if it issued a permanent injunction, “[t]he court envisions
contempt hearing after contempt hearing requiring the court to essentially conduct separate
infringement trials to determine if [defendant’s attempts to design around the patent] violates the
injunction.” Id.
199. MercExchange II, 401 F.3d at 1326–31.
200. Id. at 1339.
201. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839–41.
202. Id. at 1840–41.
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The Court remanded the case to the Federal Circuit, which, in turn,
remanded to the district court.203
The Court’s ruling in eBay opens up a new avenue of defense for
researchers at state universities. Even if a researcher is found to be
infringing a patent, he or she might be able to persuade the court to
decline to issue a permanent injunction. Cases involving basic research
at state universities might be particularly amenable to such a result. The
patentee may well be licensing its patent to others, making it more
difficult for the patentee to show irreparable harm and easier for the
researcher to show that monetary damages (in the form of an ongoing
royalty) are adequate. Furthermore, as noted above, the economic costs
to the patentee are likely to be minimal, while the harm to the researcher
is likely to be substantial (i.e., shutting down the research), tipping the
balance toward the researcher. Finally, the researcher can typically make
a strong case that his or her basic research at a public institution is in the
public good, as with Dr. Little’s research at her state university into the
cloning of agricultural animals for the benefit of farmers in her state and
around the world.204 Thus, the researcher may be able to avoid even
injunctive relief.
However, even if the court denies the injunction and allows the
research to continue, the court will, with virtual certainty, accompany
the denial with a requirement that the researcher pay royalties to the
patentee for future infringement205 (which, as discussed above, may be
what the patentee wanted in the first place). Such a result may be
unpalatable to some researchers, such as Dr. Little, but for those who
can get past this reluctance, paying the imposed royalty will avoid
shutting down the research. Such an ongoing royalty, even if it is
ultimately paid by the state, is permissible under the Ex parte Young
doctrine, because the relief is prospective, rather than retrospective.206 In
the civil rights context, courts have repeatedly held that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar injunctive relief under Ex parte Young simply

203. See id. at 1841 (remanding to the Federal Circuit); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 188
F. App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (remanding to the district court).
204. Cf. Bone, supra note 164, at 1485–86 & n.66 (making a similar point regarding preliminary
injunctions).
205. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (denying
a permanent injunction, but requiring the infringer to pay ongoing royalties to the patentee).
206. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–71 (1974) (articulating the distinction between
the two forms of relief).
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because that relief requires the state to spend funds going forward;
rather, it forbids any payment of any form of damages for past harms.207
C.

Personal Liability for Damages

Ex parte Young does not provide the only mechanism by which
plaintiffs can avoid a state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that “the Eleventh
Amendment does not prevent suits against state officers for money
damages to be paid out of the officers’ own pockets, even when the
damages are retrospective compensation for past harms.”208 Thus, an
aggrieved patentee can sue a researcher for damages in his or her
personal capacity. The rationale for this rule is that the concern of the
Eleventh Amendment is protection of the state treasury, and this concern
is not implicated if the damages are paid directly by the officer.209 The
Court has further held that the state’s indemnification of the officer is
irrelevant in this context.210
Personal capacity suits present a frightening prospect for researchers
like Dr. Little. While the state and university cannot be sued for
damages, researchers themselves can. The discussion above suggested
that these damages may not be particularly large in the patent context
(though statutory damages may add up for copyright infringement), but
“large” here is a matter of relative degree. A few tens of thousands of
dollars may not mean much to a large corporate patentee or a large state
university, but it may be devastating to a typical researcher at a state
university. Furthermore, the accused researcher will be forced to defend
him or herself in the lawsuit, the costs of which can easily run into the
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars (or, in the absence of
money to fund such a defense, forced to capitulate and terminate the
research project). In practice, this harm may be somewhat attenuated, as
most states indemnify their officials in such situations by paying for both
207. See id. Once a court grants an injunction pursuant to Ex parte Young against further
infringement (either absolutely or unless an ongoing royalty is paid), the court can enforce that
injunction and impose damages for its violation; the Edelman v. Jordan restrictions on past damages
do not apply. See 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.01[C], at 2-36 to 2-37 (concluding that
“[t]he thrust of the opinion in, Hutto, therefore, seems unmistakably clear: the [E]leventh
[A]mendment poses no barrier to a monetary award against a state as a means to secure compliance
with a prospective decree” (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)).
208. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 7.5.2, at 423.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 423–24.
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the defense and any damages.211 However, indemnification is neither
required nor universal.212 Furthermore, indemnification statutes vary
widely from state to state, and it is not clear that all of them apply to
patent and copyright infringement.213
Thus, while state universities are immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment, researchers at state universities may not share
such immunity. First, intellectual property holders may be able to
proceed under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, which permits
proceedings for injunctive relief against state officials in their official
capacities. While a court might interpret Seminole Tribe as prohibiting
such proceedings in the intellectual property context because of the
availability of other remedies, these proceedings nonetheless present
risks to researchers at state universities in the form of threats to bring the
research process to a halt. Furthermore, researchers at state universities
may face personal liability for monetary damages. Fortunately for
researchers at state universities, such personal capacity suits (at least in
the civil rights context) are subject to a very important limitation. In
211. See, e.g., Choper & Yoo, supra note 143, at 225–26 (“The limited significance of the
Edelman doctrine, however, is accentuated by the widespread system of indemnification of state
officers and the fact that the Eleventh Amendment has not been held to forbid lawsuits against them
even though they will be indemnified by their government, thus often resulting in state liability as a
matter of practical result.” (footnotes omitted)); see also, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 9
(West 1988) (indemnification); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:10A-1 (1992) (same); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§ 17 (McKinney 2001) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.285 (2001) (same); Phillip E. Hassman,
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Authorizing or Requiring Governmental Unit to
Indemnify Public Officer or Employee for Liability Arising out of Performance of Public Duties, 71
A.L.R.3d 90 (1976) (collecting cases discussing state indemnification statutes); Kevin Oates,
Professor Defend Thyself: The Failure of Universities to Defend and Indemnify Their Faculty, 39
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1063, 1086–1100 (2003) (discussing indemnification of faculty at state
universities generally).
212. See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1360 (“While most states do indemnify such individuals, it is
also true that indemnification is neither universal, unlimited in scope, nor free from possible friction
in operation.”).
213. See id. at 1360 & n.105 (discussing the wide variation in state indemnification statutes, and
the difficulties in relying on a state’s indemnification of its officers in infringement suits); Choper &
Yoo, supra note 143, at 226 (discussing the variations and limitations of indemnification); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.1, at 512 (discussing state indemnification generally and noting
that “[t]he content of the indemnification policies is determined by state and local law and hence
varies enormously among jurisdictions”). In some respects, this situation is analogous to the
difficulty courts currently have with determining whether a general business insurance policy covers
liability for patent infringements. Compare Elan Pharm. Research Corp. v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 144 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that general business insurance policy provides
for indemnification of policy holder found liable for patent infringement) with U.S. Test, Inc. v.
NDE Envtl. Corp., 196 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that general business insurance policy
does not provide for indemnification of policy holder found liable for patent infringement).
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personal capacity suits for damages, state officers are often entitled to
assert immunity.214 Immunity, particularly qualified immunity, is the
subject of the next Part.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Almost all of the law on state-officer immunity has arisen in the
context of civil rights suits, particularly personal capacity suits under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This Part explores the current state of the law of
immunity and its relationship to intellectual property infringements
committed by researchers at state universities. Part III.A discusses the
background to § 1983 and the development of the doctrines of absolute
and qualified immunity under that section.215 Part III.B then examines
the parallels between the civil rights qualified immunity doctrine and the
intellectual property laws to analyze whether a similar immunity should
apply in the intellectual property context.
A.

Immunity in the Civil Rights Context

1.

Section 1983

Congress originally enacted the provision now codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in 1871, in response to the “Black Codes” in the south.216 Section
1983 creates a cause of action for deprivations of constitutional rights or
federal statutory rights by persons acting “under color of” state law:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
214. Qualified immunity is available only in personal capacity suits requesting monetary relief; it
does not apply in proceedings that request declaratory or injunctive relief. See 1 COOK & SOBIESKI,
supra note 22, ¶ 2.06[A], at 2-255 to 2-256 (“Generally speaking, the doctrine of official immunity
is applicable only in damage actions. . . . [O]fficial immunity cannot be invoked in suits seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief . . . .”); see also id. ¶ 2.06[A]; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.3,
at 529; HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.41(b) (2d ed. 2004). Thus, even if qualified immunity applies, the researcher may still be subject
to an injunction.
215. For more detailed discussion of § 1983, see, for example, CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, ch.
8; 2 & 3 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, chs. 7–12E; LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 214, ch. 2.
216. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.2, at 469–70.
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or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .217
As Professor Chemerinsky notes:
Section 1983 serves as the basic vehicle for federal court review
of alleged state and local violations of federal law. Its
importance in defining the role of the federal courts cannot be
overstated . . . . Section 1983 is the basis for almost all
constitutional rulings arising from the actions of state and local
governments and their officers.218
Suits under § 1983 are subject to certain important limitations.
Particularly relevant to the present discussion, the Supreme Court has
held that a state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983, and therefore
§ 1983 does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit for money damages.219 Furthermore, just as with the Edelman
v. Jordan limitation on Ex parte Young, that immunity extends to state
officers sued in their official capacities.220 Thus, suits seeking money
damages under § 1983 are personal capacity suits against state
officers.221
2.

Intellectual Property Suits under Section 1983

The analysis in this paper proceeds on the assumption that an
intellectual property holder can file infringement suits or proceedings
against state officials directly under the particular intellectual property
laws. As far as I have been able to ascertain, all such suits and
proceedings filed to date have proceeded on this same assumption.222
217. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
218. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.1, at 466.
219. See id., § 8.7, at 540–42 (discussing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), and Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)).
220. See id. (concluding “[n]either states nor territories, nor their officers acting in their official
capacity, can be sued under § 1983”). However, state officials may still be subject to proceedings
for injunctive relief. See id. § 8.7, at 541; see also id. § 8.6.1, at 515 (discussing the distinction
between personal capacity and official capacity suits); id. § 7.5.2, at 428–30 (same).
221. See id. § 8.6.1, at 515 (discussing the distinction between personal capacity and official
capacity suits); id. § 7.5.2, at 428–30.
222. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
631 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 668–
71 (1999); Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Univ. of Houston
v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996), rev’d on remand, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000); Kersavage v.
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However, § 1983 also provides a cause of action against state officials in
their personal capacities for damages or injunctive relief for violations of
federal laws.223 Because researchers at state universities conduct their
research pursuant to their duties under state law, a patent infringement
amounts to a deprivation of federal statutory rights “under color of” state
law.224 Thus, it is at least possible that patentees might be able to file suit
under § 1983 for infringement of federal intellectual property laws.225
The problem with filing intellectual property suits under § 1983 is
that the intellectual property laws contain their own extensive remedial
schemes, and therefore such suits may be precluded.226 In its 1981
decision in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Ass’n,227 the Supreme Court stated “[w]hen the remedial
devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they
may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy
of suits under § 1983.”228 Both the patent act and the copyright act
contain comprehensive remedial schemes,229 and so Middlesex County
may bar § 1983 suits to enforce those acts. However, as Professor
Chemerinsky
notes,
“lower
courts
have
struggled
to

Univ. of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 687
F. Supp. 11, 12 (D. Mass. 1988), aff’d, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989). But cf. State Contracting &
Eng’g Corp. v. Florida, 258 F.3d 1329, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (dismissing patent infringement
suit filed against Florida under § 1983, on the grounds that § 1983 did not abrogate state sovereign
immunity).
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
224. See id.; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.3, at 474–81 (discussing “The Meaning
of ‘Under Color of State Law’”).
225. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.8, at 542–44, (discussing this issue and noting that in
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), “[t]he [Supreme] Court concluded that under the literal
language of the statute, § 1983 suits are available whenever any federal law has been allegedly
violated”). One of my reviewers suggested that § 1983 might in fact be the only way to file such a
suit. Cf. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989) (holding that suits against a state
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must proceed via § 1983, reflecting the Supreme Court’s trend of
funneling suits against states through § 1983).
226. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.8, at 545–48 (discussing preclusion of § 1983 actions
under certain federal statutes, particularly when the statutory scheme itself contains a
comprehensive enforcement mechanism); 2 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 7.06[C] (same).
The preclusion doctrine is somewhat akin to the limitation on the Ex parte Young doctrine invoked
by the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe, discussed supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
227. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
228. Id. at 20.
229. See 35 U.S.C. ch. 29, §§ 281–297 (2000) (“Remedies for Infringement of Patent, and Other
Actions”); 17 U.S.C. ch. 5, §§ 501–513 (“Copyright Infringement and Remedies”).
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implement . . . Middlesex County,”230 and thus the law on this point is
not entirely clear.231
Fortunately, a determination of whether a patentee may sue under
§ 1983 is likely to be unnecessary, as intellectual property holders will
almost certainly prefer to sue under the intellectual property statutes
anyway.232 Such suits are preferable because the remedies available
under the intellectual property laws are generally at least as effective as
those available under § 1983, and most of the time will be more
effective. For example, damages under § 1983 are limited to actual,
proven harms.233 In patent cases, the amount of such harm is often
difficult to demonstrate.234 However, the patent statute contains a “floor”
for damages: When actual damages cannot be calculated, the successful
patentee is entitled to at least “a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer.”235 The difference is even more
pronounced in copyright law, where statutory damages may be available
even in the absence of proof of any harm to the copyright holder.236

230. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.8, at 546; see also id. § 8.8, at 546–48 (exploring this
difficulty).
231. Cf. State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Florida, 258 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001). State
Contracting was a patent infringement suit against Florida in which a patentee alleged that the
infringement was an unconstitutional taking that could be addressed by a suit under § 1983. Id. at
1332. The court quoted the district court’s holding that Florida was immune from suit because
“‘[a]llowing Plaintiffs’ [§ 1983 claim] to proceed would vitiate the Eleventh Amendment analysis in
the Supreme Court’s College Savings Bank opinions by turning every patent infringement case
against a state into a Section 1983 takings case for patent profits,’” id. at 1337, although it
ultimately affirmed the dismissal on other grounds, id. at 1337–38.
232. This analysis assumes that such a suit brought directly under the patent or copyright laws is
permissible in general. It further assumes the use of willfulness to determine the availability of
qualified immunity in intellectual property suits, as discussed in detail infra Part IV.B. Thus, in any
case in which qualified immunity does not preclude recovery of damages, the infringement must
have been willful.
233. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.11, at 578–81 (discussing damages under § 1983 and
noting that “it is clearly established that damages exist under § 1983 to provide compensation for
actual injuries suffered”).
234. See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 187, at 335–37 (discussing the particular
difficulties in measuring damages in patent and other intellectual property cases); MERGES &
DUFFY, supra note 183, at 1067 (“[J]udicial valuation of patent rights after an infringement is very
difficult and inaccurate.”).
235. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); see also Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d
1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978) (“When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot be proved, the patent
owner is entitled to a reasonable royalty.”).
236. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a), (c). Statutory damages are available only if the copyright holder has
registered the copyright prior to the infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 412.
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Furthermore, because the infringement must have been willful,237
attorney fees would be available under the intellectual property
statutes.238
The only reason an intellectual property holder might theoretically
prefer to proceed under § 1983 would be to obtain attorney fees under
§ 1988. As noted above, attorney fees are available under the Patent and
Copyright Acts only for willful, deliberate infringements. In contrast, a
prevailing plaintiff receives an award of attorney fees in § 1983 cases
almost as a matter of course following a favorable verdict or courtenforced consent decree.239 In practice, however, this distinction is likely
to make very little difference. Because the suit is directly under § 1983,
researchers at state universities will be able to claim qualified immunity,
just as in any other action under § 1983.240 As discussed below, these
researchers should be granted such qualified immunity as long as their
conduct does not amount to willful infringement. So long as this is the
case, plaintiffs will only be able to prevail in a § 1983 action for
damages if they can show willful infringement241—and if the
infringement is willful, then attorney fees will be available under the
intellectual property laws anyway. Hence, in any case in which attorney
fees are available under § 1983 via § 1988, they should also be available
under the intellectual property statutes. Thus, the intellectual property
holder would have no incentive to sue under § 1983 rather than under
the intellectual property laws.
3.

Immunity Under Section 1983

By its terms, § 1983 creates liability for “[e]very person” who, under
color of law, deprives another of constitutional or legal rights.242
However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that state officials are
entitled to claim common law immunities from suit as they existed at the

237. Willful infringement is a necessary condition for abrogating the researcher’s qualified
immunity. See infra Part IV.B.
238. The relationship between willful infringement and attorney fees is discussed infra notes
385–87 and accompanying text.
239. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 214, § 4.5, at 342 (“A plaintiff adjudged to be a
prevailing party should ordinarily receive a fee award absent ‘special circumstances,’ such as the
plaintiff’s egregious misconduct.”).
240. See infra Part III.A.4.
241. See infra Part IV.B.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).

318

PULSINELLI.DOC

5/22/2007 7:47:14 PM

Freedom to Explore
time of the enactment of the statute in 1871.243 The Court has reviewed
the statute and its history and concluded that Congress intended to
preserve these immunities.244 The Court also reasoned that preserving
immunity was important for policy reasons.245 The purpose behind the
common law immunity was to prevent the risk of large damage awards
from making state officials timid about exercising their discretion in
doing their jobs. As the Court has described it:
The concept of the immunity of government officers from
personal liability springs from the same root considerations that
generated the doctrine of sovereign immunity. While the latter
doctrine—that the ‘King can do no wrong’—did not protect all
government officers from personal liability, the common law
soon recognized the necessity of permitting officials to perform
their official functions free from the threat of suits for personal
liability. This official immunity apparently rested, in its genesis,
on two mutually dependent rationales: (1) the injustice,
particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability
an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his
position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of
such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office
with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public
good.246
The Court concluded that these policy considerations were equally
relevant under § 1983, and state officials therefore retained their
immunity under that statute.247
Immunity under § 1983 is divided into two types, absolute and
qualified.248 Absolute immunity precludes all suits against the official,
regardless of the legality of the actions taken, so long as the action falls
within the scope of the activity to which the immunity applies.249
However, it is granted only in very limited contexts, particularly to

243. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.1, at 509–12; see also 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra
note 22, ¶ 2.06[A] (“[T]he doctrine of official immunity is a well-established limitation upon the
right of recovery under section 1983 . . . .”).
244. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.1, at 510–12.
245. See id. at 509–10.
246. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239–40 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
247. See id. at 247–48.
248. See 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.06[B].
249. See id.
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judges performing judicial acts,250 legislators performing legislative
acts,251 prosecutors performing prosecutorial functions,252 police officers
testifying as witnesses,253 and the President of the United States
performing acts carrying out the presidency.254 Thus, traditional absolute
immunity has no application to defendant researchers at state
universities in intellectual property infringement suits;255 their only
avenue for immunity is qualified immunity.
4.

Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983

Qualified immunity, on the other hand, has much broader application.
Qualified immunity is available to any state official performing his or
her duties in good faith.256 Historically, the Supreme Court applied a test
with both objective and subjective factors in determining when qualified
immunity should apply.257 Then, with Harlow v. Fitzgerald258 in 1982,
the Court established a purely objective standard for qualified immunity
in § 1983 cases:
[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions[]
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.259
This statement encapsulates the current standard for applying qualified
immunity under § 1983. In a later case, the Court expounded upon the
relationship between this standard and the policy behind the doctrine:
[P]ermitting damages suits against government officials can
entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of
personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly

250. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.2, at 517–20.
251. See id. at 520–22.
252. See id. at 522–26.
253. See id. at 526–27.
254. See id. at 527–28.
255. Part V, infra, proposes creating a new absolute immunity for researchers at state universities
accused of intellectual property infringement.
256. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.3, at 528–29 (noting that qualified immunity is also
known as “good faith immunity”).
257. See id. § 8.6.3, at 528–31 (reviewing the history of qualified immunity under § 1983).
258. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
259. Id. at 818.
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inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties. Our cases have
accommodated these conflicting concerns by generally
providing government officials performing discretionary
functions with a qualified immunity, shielding them from civil
damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have
been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have
violated.260
The Court has also observed that “[a]s the qualified immunity defense
has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”261
Thus, the Supreme Court has developed a variety of immunity
defenses that blunt the effects of the civil rights laws on individual state
officers. Some special state actors are permitted an absolute immunity,262
and all are permitted at least to assert a claim to qualified immunity.263
State actors will typically receive this immunity so long as they had no
reason to know that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional or
statutory rights.264
B.

Qualified Immunity in the Intellectual Property Context

Having established the standard for qualified immunity under § 1983,
the next issue is whether to apply the same qualified immunity in the
intellectual property context, and if so, how to apply it.265 A comparison
of the law and policy behind qualified immunity in the civil rights area
and in the intellectual property area shows that many of the same
concerns are implicated. Furthermore, examination of the present
intellectual property statutory regimes indicates that they should be read
as preserving the possibility of a qualified immunity defense for
researchers sued in their personal capacities. Finally, the policies behind
the patent law experimental use exemption and the copyright fair use
260. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (internal citation omitted).
261. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
262. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.2, at 517–28.
263. See id. § 8.6.3, at 528–29.
264. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
265. The Supreme Court has recognized qualified immunity outside the § 1983 context (albeit
still in the civil rights context). For example, federal officials are entitled to assert a qualified
immunity in so-called “Bivens actions,” based on the rule from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 496–504 (1978) (recognizing that qualified immunity is the same for federal officials facing
Bivens action as it is for state officials facing § 1983 actions).
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defense provide the necessary support for a qualified immunity defense
for researchers at state universities accused of patent or copyright
infringement.
1.

Availability of Qualified Immunity

In deciding whether qualified immunity should apply in suits under
§ 1983, the Supreme Court looked at the structure and history of that
statute in light of the policy behind qualified immunity and concluded
that Congress intended qualified immunity to apply in these suits.266
Similarly, in determining whether researchers at state universities may
enjoy qualified immunity in intellectual property suits, courts should
look at the structure and history of the relevant intellectual property
statutes in light of the policy behind qualified immunity, and decide
whether Congress intended for qualified immunity to apply to these
suits. As noted above, the policy behind qualified immunity is to avoid
the risk of large monetary damage awards that could make state officials
timid about exercising their discretion in doing their jobs.267
In many respects, the policy behind § 1983 qualified immunity fits the
research situation quite nicely. If we believe that the research that
researchers like Dr. Little perform at state universities is important for
the social good, then we do not want the risk of large damage awards to
cause these researchers to avoid using the most effective methods or
sources to pursue their research. Such timidity on the part of researchers
might delay or prevent important breakthroughs. Therefore, we should
give researchers some protection in doing their jobs, again so long as
they are not violating clearly established law.268
On the other hand, unlike § 1983, the patent and copyright laws
contain fairly comprehensive statutory regimes that lay out explicit rules
for remedies,269 including defenses,270 and these statutes contain no

266. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 214, § 2.22.
267. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19.
268. The interpretation of “violating clearly established law” in the context of patent and
copyright infringement is discussed in detail infra Part IV.B.
269. See 35 U.S.C. ch. 29, §§ 281–297 (2000) (“Remedies for Infringement of Patent, and Other
Actions”); 17 U.S.C. ch. 5, §§ 501–513 (2000) (“Copyright Infringement and Remedies”).
270. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“Presumption of validity; defenses”); id. § 286 (“Time limitation on
damages”); id. § 287 (“Limitation on damages and other remedies; marking and notice”); see also
id. § 273 (“Defense to infringement based on earlier inventor” that applies only to business method
patents). The Copyright Act does not define “defenses” so explicitly. However, it specifies the
rights of the copyright owner, 17 U.S.C. § 106, and then provides a series of provisions limiting and
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mention of immunities, qualified or otherwise. This pronounced absence
suggests that reading one in is perhaps a stretch.271 Because qualified
immunity is a policy-driven construct of the common law, rather than a
constitutional guarantee or other immutable aspect of state sovereign
immunity, Congress is free to eliminate it where it chooses.272 Indeed,
the Remedy Clarification Acts, insofar as they survive Florida Prepaid,
might be read to suggest that Congress has in fact eliminated immunity
for patent infringement. The Patent Remedy Clarification Act added 35
U.S.C. § 271(h):
As used in this section, the term “whoever” includes any State,
any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a
State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity.
Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee,
shall be subject to the provisions of this title in the same manner
and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.273
And just in case that section did not express Congress’s intent clearly
enough, the Act also included § 296(a):
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his
official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh
amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court
by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental
entity, for infringement of a patent under section 271, or for any
other violation under this title.274
The clear thrust of these sections is to make states, including their
officers, liable for patent infringement just like non-governmental

defining the scope of those rights, id. §§ 107–122. Any of these enumerated limitations may provide
a defense in a particular case. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571–72
(1994) (asserting fair use under § 107 as a defense); Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212,
1213–15 (9th Cir. 2000) (asserting the right to make pictorial representations of an architectural
work under § 120 as a defense). See generally 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 182, at
§§ 13.04–13.09 (discussing defenses in copyright cases).
271. Of course, the application of state sovereign immunity—with all its complexities and
exceptions—to intellectual property law is of relatively recent origin, and so it is not surprising that
the drafters of the Patent Act in 1952 failed to discuss qualified immunity specifically (at least prior
to the Patent Remedy Clarification Act).
272. See Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1127 (“[Q]ualified immunity is a doctrine of the
common law, and as such it is subject to override by a duly enacted federal statute.”).
273. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h).
274. Id. § 296(a).
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entities or persons. Such a direct statement of purpose would seem to
leave very little room for concepts like qualified immunity.
However, the specific language of both statutes refers specifically to
removing immunity for “any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity.”275 This choice
of language seems to invoke the concept of “official capacity”
proceedings under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, suggesting that the
purpose of the statute is to overcome the Edelman v. Jordan restriction
on that doctrine that precludes suits for retrospective damages.276 If so,
the statute would appear to have no impact on “personal capacity” suits,
and their accompanying qualified immunity. Under this reading, the
statute does not abrogate qualified immunity.
This interpretation of the statute as having no impact on personal
capacity suits appears to be the one made by the Fifth Circuit in Chavez
v. Arte Publico Press,277 a copyright case decided after the effective date
of the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act but before the Supreme
Court decided Seminole Tribe or Florida Prepaid. The Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act has two sections containing language virtually
identical to the language quoted from the two sections of the Patent
Remedy Clarification Act.278 The Chavez court first upheld the validity
of the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act under Congress’s Intellectual
Property Clause powers, holding that Congress had abrogated sovereign
immunity for the state of Texas and one of its officials acting in his
official capacity, rendering the state potentially liable for damages for
copyright infringement.279 The court then turned to the suit against the
official in his personal capacity.280 Although it did not directly address
the question of whether the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act had
abrogated qualified immunity, it allowed the official to assert the
defense and concluded that, on the facts of the case, he was entitled to
claim qualified immunity.281 By implication, therefore, the court must

275. Id. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (emphasis added).
276. The Edelman v. Jordan restriction on Ex parte Young proceedings is discussed supra
notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
277. 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Univ. of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184
(1996), rev’d on remand, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
278. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511 with 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296.
279. Chavez, 59 F.3d at 543–47.
280. Id. at 547.
281. Id. at 547–48.
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have concluded that qualified immunity survived the Remedy
Clarification Acts.
Furthermore, the precise effect of Florida Prepaid on the Patent
Remedy Clarification Act is not entirely clear, and thus the status of the
sections amended by that Act282 remains in doubt. Nowhere in the
Florida Prepaid decision does the Court precisely state its holding with
respect to the validity of the statutes.283 The Court focused almost
entirely on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and the liability of
the state of Florida itself, and thus its holding that the Patent Remedy
Clarification Act was invalid, at least insofar as it purported to abrogate
the sovereign immunity of the states, is clear.284 However, the Court did
not discuss the liability of state officers in their personal capacities, and
therefore their status under the Act in that regard is not clear. Based on
this lack of discussion, the decision might be read as invalidating the
relevant sections only insofar as they apply to the states directly.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Court’s approach to the case,
which was to assess the impact of the Patent Remedy Clarification Act
on Florida’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.285 The Court concluded
that Congress had exceeded its powers in its attempt to make states
directly liable for patent infringements (and, presumably, also in its
attempt to make officials liable in their official capacities for more than
prospective relief). However, qualified immunity is a common law
doctrine, not a constitutional doctrine, and Congress is free to abrogate it
via statute.286 Thus, the Court’s theory of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is likely irrelevant to suits against officials in their personal
capacities or the assertion by such officials of a qualified immunity
defense, and therefore the part of the statute referring to officials
arguably survives the Court’s declaration of unconstitutionality. Under
this reading of Florida Prepaid, Congress has effectively abrogated that
qualified immunity by clearly making officials liable under the statute
without reference to any form of immunity.

282. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a).
283. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
284. See id. at 647–48 & passim.
285. This was probably due largely to the fact that Florida Prepaid, an arm of the state, was the
only defendant; no individual defendants were named in the suit. See id. at 631.
286. See Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1127.
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On the other hand, the decision is couched in terms of the Patent
Remedy Clarification Act as a whole. At the beginning of its opinion,
the Court stated:
[T]he Court of Appeals held that Congress had validly abrogated
the State’s sovereign immunity from infringement suits pursuant
to its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
hold that . . . the statute cannot be sustained as legislation
enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and accordingly reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.287
Then, at the end of its opinion, the Court added:
The Patent Remedy Act’s indiscriminate scope offends this
principle [of proportionality between the constitutional violation
and the remedy], and is particularly incongruous in light of the
scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that
Congress intended to remedy. . . . The historical record and the
scope of coverage therefore make it clear that the Patent
Remedy Act cannot be sustained under § 5. . . . The statute’s
apparent and more basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy
for patent infringement and to place States on the same footing
as private parties under that regime. These are proper Article I
concerns, but that Article does not give Congress the power to
enact such legislation after Seminole Tribe.288
The most straightforward reading of these portions of the text is that the
Court invalidated the statutory provisions in their entirety. They are
therefore of no effect and cannot be read as defeating qualified
immunity. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Act contains
no “savings clause” that would allow parts of it to remain in effect if
other parts are struck down.289
Regardless of the status and interpretation of the amendments made
by the Patent Remedy Clarification Act, the general terms of the patent
infringement statute may be broad enough to preclude an immunity

287. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630. Which “statute” the Court meant is never clearly
established.
288. Id. at 647–48 (footnote omitted).
289. See Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106
Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. and 7 U.S.C.); see also ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 36, at 30–31 (making a similar
observation about the continuing viability of the Remedy Clarification Acts, including the absence
of savings clauses).
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defense. Each liability provision in the patent infringement statute290 is
phrased in terms of “whoever” undertakes certain defined actions being
guilty of infringement, indicating that Congress intended a broad reach
for this section.291 Such broad reach might well be seen as leaving no
room for qualified immunity. However, § 1983 is expressed in similarly
broad terms (“[e]very person”292), and the Court has had no difficulty in
reading it as permitting a qualified immunity defense.293 Furthermore,
absent the amendments of the Patent Remedy Clarification Act, the
statute lacks anything like a clear statement of intent to abrogate
qualified immunity for state officials, and so a court might be reluctant
to read such intent into the statutory language. Courts considering this
issue have concluded that a qualified immunity defense is at least
potentially available in intellectual property cases.294
When these possibilities are considered together, the conflicting
indications in the statutes and Supreme Court precedents make drawing
firm conclusions on the issue of qualified immunity difficult. However,
the best reading of the present statutory regime is that it preserves the
possibility of a qualified immunity defense for researchers sued in their
personal capacities. Many commentators who have addressed Florida
Prepaid have similarly concluded (or assumed) that qualified immunity
survived the decision.295 In fact, these commentators raise the possibility
of abrogating qualified immunity and allowing the patentee to collect
from individual officers as a way to address some of the problems
created by Florida Prepaid.296 Because these officers will presumably be
290. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
291. The Copyright Act uses the similarly broad “anyone.” See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
292. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
293. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.1, at 509; 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22,
¶ 2.06[A].
294. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 540 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Univ.
of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996), rev’d on remand, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000);
Kersavage v. Univ. Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of
Boston, 687 F. Supp. 11, 12 (D. Mass. 1988), aff’d, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989). These decisions
are discussed in more detail infra Part IV.B.1.
295. See, e.g., Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1122–26 (concluding that state officials are
entitled to claim qualified immunity for intellectual property infringements); Meltzer, supra note 13,
at 1357 & n.96 (conducting, in a footnote, an abbreviated analysis along the same lines as the one in
this section, with a similarly hedged conclusion); cf. Menell, supra note 13, at 1407–08 (arguing
that qualified immunity does not generally apply in intellectual property cases, but also suggesting
the possibility that qualified immunity might apply to certain types of copyright infringement “for
research or educational purposes”).
296. See, e.g., Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1126–30 (discussing whether Congress should
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indemnified by the state, the end result is equivalent to suing the state
while avoiding the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment.297
2.

The Experimental Use Exemption and Fair Use Defense

Assuming the statutes as currently written and interpreted under
Florida Prepaid do not preclude qualified immunity, the issue becomes
whether researchers at state universities should, as a matter of policy and
existing law, be permitted to assert a qualified immunity defense. As
noted above, the qualified immunity doctrines derive from common law
immunities that existed at the time § 1983 was enacted. The patent and
copyright laws have related historical doctrines that excused certain
otherwise infringing acts—notably the experimental use exemption in
patent law and the fair use defense in copyright law—and these
doctrines provide the necessary justification for a qualified immunity in
the intellectual property context. Just like the common-law immunities,
these exceptions implement important public policies, and thus suggest
that researchers at state universities should be able to invoke qualified
immunity.
a.

Patent Law: The Experimental Use Exemption298

The common-law experimental use exemption299 is an important but
narrow patent law doctrine that exempts certain uses of patented
inventions from claims of infringement. The doctrine traces its roots to
Justice Story’s 1813 opinion in Whittemore v. Cutter.300 According to
Justice Story, “it could never have been the intention of the legislature to
abrogate qualified immunity for intellectual property infringements); cf. Meltzer, supra note 13, at
1359–61 (discussing the difficulties that would remain even if Congress abrogated qualified
immunity, but also noting that such an abrogation may have some benefit).
297. See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1359–61 (discussing such a plan, and noting its potential
problems).
298. The following discussion is condensed from my earlier exploration of the experimental use
exemption. See Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded
Inventions under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 418–28 (2006).
299. This Article uses the term “experimental use exemption” rather than “research exemption,”
as that is the term more commonly used in the literature. This usage is not to be confused with the
doctrine of “experimental use” as applied to negating a prior public use or sale. See, e.g., City of
Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877) (applying the experimental use
doctrine); see also Gregory N. Pate, Analysis of the Experimental Use Exception, 3 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 253, 256 (2002) (noting that “[t]he ‘experimental use exception’ actually describes two
entirely separate [patent law] doctrines”).
300. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. May 1813) (No. 17,600).
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punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects.”301 Justice Story subsequently
distinguished this type of use from “the making with an intent to use for
profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to
ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification.”302 As Judge
Newman of the Federal Circuit recently noted, when these cases were
decided in 1813, “philosophical experiments” referred to “natural
philosophy”—what we now call simply “science.”303 Justice Story’s
creation rapidly evolved into an accepted defense to infringement, as
evidenced by its inclusion in treatises from the late nineteenth century.304
The experimental use exemption is premised on the idea that patent
law is eminently a utilitarian doctrine. As a consequence, pure research
not directed towards profits, such as that performed by Dr. Little and
other researchers at state universities, should be deemed non-infringing,
as it does not interfere with the pecuniary interests of the patentee.305
Similarly, one of the major purposes of the patent system is to provide
an incentive for inventors to disclose their invention and thereby get
technical information into the hands of those who can make use of it.306
Thus, the common-law experimental use exemption, as traditionally
understood, allows for non-commercial research on the patented
invention.307
301. Id. at 1121.
302. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. Oct. 1813) (No. 12,391).
303. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 874–75 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting), vacated, 545 U.S. 193, (2005); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae Bar
Ass’n of the District of Columbia—Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section in Support of Neither
Party at 6–8, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237)
(“Later cases show that the term ‘philosophical,’ as used in Whittemore [], is synonymous with the
term ‘scientific.’”).
304. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing
the history of the experimental use exemption and citing W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898 (1890)).
305. As a corollary of this view of the doctrine, research done in a corporate context is virtually
never deemed to be eligible for the exemption. See Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an
Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 626–30 (1985)
(collecting cases).
306. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 12 (2004).
307. For a summary and discussion of some of the varying proposed implementations of an
experimental use system, including its widespread use in foreign patent systems, see NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 108–17 (Stephen A. Merrill,
Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (chapter entitled “Seven Recommendations for a
21st-Century Patent System: Shield Some Research Uses of Patented Inventions from Infringement
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Commentary on the common-law experimental use exemption has
been mixed. Some commentators believe that any but the most minimal
exemption is entirely inappropriate and undermines the strength of the
patent system.308 Others counter that the doctrine plays a crucial role in
the law, particularly in accommodating patent law to the norms of
science (principally the scientific norm of the free sharing of ideas and
techniques as part of a unified endeavor), especially in the realm of
“basic” research; the doctrine is also important in resolving otherwise
intractable sharing problems (such as anticommons).309
Cases involving the common-law experimental use exemption for
researchers at academic institutions have arisen only infrequently. The
exemption for such researchers has traditionally operated more
informally—historically, academic scientists have patented their
inventions only rarely, and commercial patentees have sued academic
researchers only rarely.310 The modern emphasis on extracting a patent’s
full value, coupled with an increase in profit-motivated research in
universities, is causing a shift in this behavior, and so experimental use
has recently taken on more importance.311
The Federal Circuit has generally viewed the common-law
experimental use exemption with grave suspicion, reading the exemption

Liability”).
308. See generally, e.g., Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 357 (1957); Jordan P. Karp, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The
Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991); Michael S. Mireles, An Examination
of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology
Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 201–05, 211–16 (2004); Heather Hamme Ramirez,
Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination of the “Tragedy of the
Anticommons” in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 384–88 (2004).
309. See generally, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Hantman, supra note 305; Janice M.
Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement
for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Protecting the
Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L.
REV. 457 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 81 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004). Cf. generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1177, 1193, 1197 (2000) (proposing
a “fair use” right for patent law based on the copyright fair use doctrine).
310. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY at 35 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (“The strength and contours of the defense have not been fully tested;
as several panelists testified, corporations typically have not sued universities.”).
311. See Dreyfuss, supra note 309, at 457–61 (exploring the reasons for this shift).
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narrowly.312 The Supreme Court has not recently addressed the scope of
the common-law research exemption directly; however, it demonstrated
its greater acceptance of such doctrines when it reversed the Federal
Circuit’s narrow reading of the statutory research exemption (which
applies to research relating to FDA drug approval313) and expanded this
exemption to exempt a broader range of conduct.314
Despite the Federal Circuit’s current reluctance to endorse the
experimental use exemption, the doctrine has an important role to play in
giving researchers flexibility to explore patented technology. Indeed, as
Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit noted in her dissent in Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA:
The patent statute [in § 112] requires full disclosure of the
invention, including details of enabling experiments and
technical drawings and best modes and preferred embodiments,
even commercial sources of special components. Such details
would be idle and purposeless if this information cannot be used
for 17–20 years [i.e., the length of the patent term]. . . . To the
contrary, the patent system both contemplates and facilitates
research into patented subject matter, whether the purpose is
scientific understanding or evaluation or comparison or
improvement. Such activities are integral to the advance of
technology.315
Thus, just as the Supreme Court found that § 1983 retained the common
law’s qualified immunity because of its long history and the important
312. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (declining to allow the
exemption; holding expressed in very broad language that leaves only a narrow exemption), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Rader, J., concurring) (“[N]either the statute nor any past Supreme Court precedent gives
any reason to excuse infringement because it was committed with a particular purpose or intent,
such as for scientific experimentation or idle curiosity.”); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.,
733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But see Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860,
872–78 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing for a more robust common-law
experimental use exemption and asserting that the broad language of Madey was unnecessary dicta),
vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
313. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention . . . solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”).
314. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–08 (2005) (interpreting
§ 271(e) to permit research into a patented compound even if the data generated was never
submitted to the FDA, as long as it was “reasonably related” to the process of generating data to
submit to the FDA).
315. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 875 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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policies it serves,316 courts should find that the long-standing
experimental use exemption implements important patent law policies.
The rationale behind experimental use—permitting research uses aimed
at further exploration of the patented technology without a profit
motive—dovetails nicely with the work done by researchers at state
universities. The exemption should therefore serve as a basis for
qualified immunity for researchers at state universities.
b.

Copyright Law: The Fair Use Defense

Like the experimental use exemption, the fair use defense traces its
roots to an opinion by Justice Story.317 However, unlike experimental
use, fair use has been codified in the copyright law.318 Thus, it is a
stronger, better-established doctrine, and as such it can serve as a
justification for qualified immunity in the copyright context.
The fair use defense serves several important functions in copyright
law. In large part, it is inextricably linked to academic pursuits and the
use of copyrighted works in such pursuits. According to the House
Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976, “[t]he specific
wording of section 107 [codifying fair use] as it now stands is the result
of a process of accretion, resulting from the long controversy over the
related problems of fair use and the reproduction (mostly by
photocopying) of copyrighted material for educational and scholarly
purposes.”319 Allowing certain otherwise infringing uses as fair use also
advances the goals of the Constitution by encouraging the creation of
new works following upon existing works.320 Fair use further helps
release First Amendment tension by permitting as fair use some forms of
free speech that might otherwise be suppressed by copyright holders.321
In some cases, fair use can remedy market failures that prevent the use
of a work even where such use is economically viable, such as cases
where transaction costs make the transaction infeasible322 or where the
316. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); see also supra Part III.A.4.
317. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
318. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
319. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
320. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 10.1, at 213
(2003) (“[T]he fair use doctrine prevents ‘rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” (quoting Iowa
State Univ. Res. Found. v. Am. Broad. Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980))).
321. See id. § 10.7, at 247–48.
322. See id. § 10.1, at 214–16.
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use of the work is in a critique or parody that the copyright holder
refuses to license.323
The fair use provision of the Copyright Act states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.324
The statute represents a codification of the pre-existing common law
doctrine.325 It provides a general list of types of uses deemed “fair,”
followed by an illustrative, rather than exhaustive, list of factors to be
considered in deciding whether a particular use is “fair.”326
As codified in the statute, some of the canonical categories of fair use
are “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research.”327 Thus, the sort of uses that researchers at state universities
will be making of copyrighted works fall neatly into the fair use
category. However, fitting the use into a statutory category does not end
323. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the
Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993) (discussing the role of fair use in
overcoming market failure in the form of “bargaining breakdown” that results when non-economic
factors prevent the completion of an otherwise economically viable transaction). In general, the
copyright holder has a right to refuse to license any and all others, except in rare cases where that
refusal would violate antitrust principals and would thus amount to copyright misuse. See generally
4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 182, § 13.09 (discussing copyright misuse).
324. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
325. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
326. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
327. Id.
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the fair use inquiry.328 Fair uses must also be analyzed using the four
factors in the statute. In practice, the inquiry under the first factor, the
purpose and character of the use, focuses on whether the use fits one of
the enumerated categories, whether the use is commercial, and whether
the use is transformative of the original work or mere copying.329 The
inquiry under the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
looks at whether the work is at the copyright “core” of creative,
expressive works, or whether it is instead largely factual in nature, with
use of the latter being more likely to be found fair.330 For the third factor,
the amount and substantiality of the portion used, the inquiry focuses on
whether the party asserting fair use has taken a quantitatively or
qualitatively large portion of the work, and whether the amount taken
was more than was necessary for the purported fair use.331 The fourth
factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted
work, is now deemed the most important.332 The inquiry under this
factor requires deciding whether the new work opens new markets, or
whether it merely usurps the demand for the existing work, causing harm
to its market value.333
The case law addressing fair use is very inconsistent, in large part
because the nature of the inquiry is so fact-intensive and subjective, but
also because the doctrine itself is complex, vague, and ill-defined.334
Indeed, the House Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976
observed:
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use
doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept
has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule
of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and

328. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 320, § 10.2.1, at 218. Nor is it even a necessary part
of it—the list of categories is not exclusive, and so uses not enumerated may still be deemed fair
uses. See id.
329. See id., § 10.2.1, at 218–24.
330. See id., § 10.2.2, at 224–26.
331. See id., § 10.2.3, at 226–27.
332. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“This
last factor [effect on the market] is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”
(citing 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 182, § 13.05[A])).
333. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 320, § 10.2.4, at 227–31.
334. See id. § 10.2, at 216–17.
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each case raising the question must be decided on its own
facts.335
It is therefore often hard to judge in advance what will be found to be a
“fair use” of a copyrighted work and what will instead be found an
infringement.336 As a consequence, however, anyone using a copyrighted
work in an academic context (barring a blatant commercial use) will be
able to make at least a colorable claim that his or her use qualifies as
fair, and proving that such a claim is made in bad faith is likely to be
very difficult.
Thus, fair use specifically applies to copyright use in the academic
context. Just like the experimental use exemption, the fair use defense
has long-standing common law roots and it implements important
copyright law policies by giving researchers flexibility to analyze,
criticize, and use copyrighted works. And also just like the experimental
use exemption, the fair use defense should therefore serve as a firm basis
for qualified immunity for researchers at state universities.
3.

Potential Problems with the Experimental Use Exemption and Fair
Use Defense

A possible objection to justifying qualified immunity under the
experimental use exemption or fair use defense is that these doctrines
make qualified immunity unnecessary. Because those doctrines are both
directly available as defenses to infringement suits, what purpose is
served by having a qualified immunity based on them? The difference is
that a successful experimental use or fair use defense requires that the
researcher be right—the use must actually qualify as an experimental
use or fair use. Thus, if a court disagrees with the researcher’s
assessment of the situation, then the researcher is liable for the
infringement. In contrast, with a qualified immunity defense, the
researcher need only demonstrate a good-faith, reasonable belief that the
use was experimental or fair.337 Even if a court ultimately concludes that
the use was not, in fact, experimental or fair, the researcher will still be
able to claim qualified immunity as long as he or she had a good-faith,

335. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
336. See II PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.1, at 12:3–12:4 (3d ed. 2006)
(“[The fair use doctrine is] a source of frustration to the lawyer who needs to know whether his or
her client can safely proceed with a project that skirts the edges of liability.”).
337. See infra Part IV.B; see also Bone, supra note 164, at 1484–85.
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reasonable belief that the use was experimental or fair.338 Thus, qualified
immunity will protect the researcher in situations where the
experimental use or fair use defenses will not, and so qualified immunity
has an important role to play.339
The Supreme Court has developed a variety of immunity doctrines to
protect state officers in civil rights suits. The rationale behind the civil
rights doctrine of qualified immunity bears substantial similarity to the
rationale behind some important intellectual property law doctrines. In
particular, the patent law doctrine of experimental use and the copyright
law doctrine of fair use share a significantly parallel rationale with the
qualified immunity doctrine, and thus can serve to justify the application
of qualified immunity in the intellectual property context.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
As detailed in the preceding sections, a strong argument can be made
that, under current law, qualified immunity should apply in the
intellectual property context. Assuming that it does, courts will need a
framework to apply it in that context. At present, the only extant
framework for applying qualified immunity arises out of suits filed
under § 1983, so those cases must therefore serve as the starting point
for applying qualified immunity in other contexts. Part IV uses doctrines
from current law to develop a framework for applying qualified
immunity in the intellectual property arena. Part IV.A starts by
describing how courts apply qualified immunity in the civil rights area.
Part IV.B then applies the concepts of Part IV.A to intellectual property
suits against researchers at state universities. After reviewing the few
existing cases that address this issue, it turns to the intellectual property
doctrine of willful infringement as a close analogue to the civil rights
doctrine of qualified immunity. It uses the willful infringement doctrine
as the basis for a proposed framework for applying qualified immunity
338. The same rule applies in willful infringement cases. As long as the accused infringer has a
good-faith, reasonable belief that his or her conduct does not infringe, the infringement cannot be
willful, even if that belief turns out to have been entirely mistaken. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1535–39 (D. Mass. 1990), amended for clerical
errors by 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (D. Mass. 1990) (even though opinion of counsel was
incorrect on the infringement issue, it was competently prepared and therefore the infringement was
not willful). The Polaroid case is discussed in 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 180,
§ 20.03[4][b][v][C] at 20-364 to 20-365.
339. Of course, if the researcher is correct in his or her belief that the use was experimental or
fair, then either defense will itself defeat liability.
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in intellectual property suits against researchers at state universities. Part
IV.C concludes by addressing some potential problems in using the
willful infringement doctrines to implement qualified immunity for
researchers at state universities.
A.

Applying Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983

As described in Part III.A.4 above, the objective standard the
Supreme Court has set forth for qualified immunity in § 1983 cases is:
[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions[]
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.340
The first element of this standard is whether the official is
“performing discretionary functions.”341 The Supreme Court has used
this phrase in contrast to ministerial functions that are dictated by
statutes or other positive law, or directly ordered by superior state
officials, for which functions qualified immunity is generally
inapplicable.342 Under this standard, researchers in the laboratory are
clearly performing discretionary functions. Researchers always choose
their own techniques and sources for their research; these elements of
the research enterprise are not (and indeed could not be) dictated by
provisions of law or other officials.343 Indeed, most researchers would
rebel if any other official attempted to dictate the course of the research.
Therefore, qualified immunity will depend on whether researchers
“violate [a] clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of

340. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
341. Id.
342. See id. at 816 (“[Qualified i]mmunity generally is available only to officials performing
discretionary functions. In contrast with the thought processes accompanying ‘ministerial’ tasks, the
judgments surrounding discretionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker’s
experiences, values, and emotions.”); see also LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 214, § 2.22
(discussing the history of qualified immunity and noting that the Supreme Court embraced “a
doctrine that defendants sued in their individual capacity with respect to discretionary, as opposed to
merely ministerial, functions would enjoy qualified immunity from damages . . . .”); 1 COOK &
SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.06[B], at 2-278 (discussing the discretionary/ministerial distinction).
343. In the broadest sense, some techniques may be limited by law—such as techniques involving
human subjects or embryonic stem cells—and these limitations may be important. However, the
day-to-day selection of techniques, sources, and reagents is very much at the discretion of the
researcher.
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which a reasonable person would have known.”344 This standard has
proved rather troublesome in the civil rights context, and courts have
struggled with determining the level of generality at which it should be
applied.345 At the highest level, all constitutional and statutory rights are
clearly established. For example, the right to be free of unlawful
searches and seizures is certainly “clearly established.”346 But that
observation does not help in answering the question of whether a state
official who commits a particular act that might violate that right is
nevertheless entitled to claim qualified immunity for suit under § 1983.
In practice, therefore, courts must look at the specifics of a particular
incident—for example, did this search and seizure violate a clearly
established right?347 Answering that question involves examining the
searches and seizures that have previously been deemed illegal and
determining whether the standards established in those cases should
have revealed to a reasonable state official that his or her conduct
violated a clearly established right.348
B.

Applying Qualified Immunity in the Intellectual Property Context

In the intellectual property context, qualified immunity is applicable
only when no “clearly established [intellectual property] right” has been
violated. Patentees and copyright holders, of course, have a “clearly
established right” not to have their patents and copyrights infringed.
However, stating the problem in those terms is clearly at the wrong level
of abstraction.349 The real issue must be how to judge whether a
“reasonable” researcher would have known he or she was violating the
right (that is, infringing the patent or copyright) in a particular patent or
344. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
345. See 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.06[B], at 2-269 to 2-273 (discussing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), and observing that in that case, “the Court candidly acknowledged
that determination of whether conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right depends
substantially on the level of generality used to define the relevant constitutional rule”).
346. See id. ¶ 2.06[B].
347. See id. Determining whether a particular right is “clearly established” in the civil rights
context has generated an enormously complex body of law that is fraught with ambiguity and circuit
splits about the appropriate level of abstraction. See id. Fortunately, most of the complexity is
directly applicable only in the civil rights context and does not easily translate into other contexts. I
will therefore not explore the issue further here. For further exposition of this topic, see id.;
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.3, at 533–39; LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 214, § 2.22.
348. See 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.06[B].
349. Cf. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639–41 (making a similar observation regarding warrantless
searches).
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copyright case. Fortunately, both of those bodies of law already have
doctrines that are helpful for answering that question. Before looking at
patent and copyright law and proposing a framework for qualified
immunity, Part IV.B.1 reviews the few intellectual property cases that
discuss qualified immunity.
1.

Prior Cases

Only a few courts have addressed the issue of qualified immunity in
intellectual property cases directly, and their holdings cover the
spectrum of possible outcomes. The first two cases, Kersavage v. The
University of Tennessee350 and Lane v. First National Bank of Boston,351
were decided after the Supreme Court held in Atascadero that Congress
needed to express its intent clearly in order to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, but before the Remedy Clarification Acts provided the
requisite clear statements. The third, Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,352
was decided after the Remedy Clarification Acts were enacted, but
before Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid.353
In Kersavage, Joseph Kersavage sued the University of Tennessee
and two of its professors for patent infringement.354 The University and
both professors filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds of sovereign
immunity.355 The district court held that the University, as an arm of the
state, was entitled to absolute immunity, and this immunity extended to
the professors acting in their official capacity.356 It then went on to
consider the professors’ assertion of qualified immunity in the suit
against them in their personal capacities.357 The court stated,
“th[is c]ourt does not believe that qualified immunity applies to the
individual defendants as a matter of law because the law of patent
infringement is clearly established, relegating the application of such
350. 731 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
351. 687 F. Supp. 11 (D. Mass. 1988), aff’d, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989).
352. 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Univ. of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184
(1996), rev’d on remand, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
353. A fourth case, Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988), also
considered (and denied) an immunity defense in a copyright case. See id. at 122–23. However, the
asserted immunity was based on state law, and so the court did not discuss traditional qualified
immunity. See id.
354. Kersavage, 731 F. Supp. at 1328. Kersavage was also a professor at the University. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1329–30.
357. Id. at 1330.
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immunity to be decided as a question of fact.”358 Thus, while it did not
reject the defense of qualified immunity, it held that it was a factual
question that must be reserved for trial.359 On reconsideration, the court
appeared to shift its position, stating:
The question of whether these two individual defendants
infringed the plaintiff’s patent does not present the kind of
question or circumstances to which a defense of qualified
immunity applies. The issue is wholly factual. . . . Although the
question of qualified immunity is initially one of law, the Court
is convinced that based on the allegations of the complaint, the
individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity requires the contours of the law to be
sufficiently clear “for any reasonable official in the defendant’s
position to know that what the official is doing violates [a]
right.” The complaint and evidence submitted in support of the
motions presently before the Court raise an issue of fact based
on allegations that the defendants were aware of the plaintiff’s
patent rights and used a similar invention in a manner that
infringed these rights. If true, the defendants surely knew under
established patent law that their actions would violate the law
protecting patent rights. Furthermore, denial of qualified
immunity as a matter of law permits the defense to be asserted
as one of good faith immunity to liability to be decided on the
facts.360
Thus, the court appears to have held that a defense based on qualified
immunity can never succeed in a patent case because the issue is so factintensive that it cannot be decided as a matter of law; instead, the
individual defendants are entitled to assert a “good-faith immunity”
defense as an issue to be decided on the facts.361

358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1332 (citations omitted).
361. Although the opinion is not entirely clear on this point, the court appears to have possibly
misunderstood the principle of “good-faith immunity.” “Good-faith immunity” is often used as an
alternative term for qualified immunity, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.3, at 528–29, but
this does not seem to be how the court is using the term. The court’s citation is at best obliquely
related to the issue, but it might be read as invoking the concept of the “good-faith defense” that is
sometimes permitted to private citizens sued under § 1983 for malicious prosecution or other uses of
judicial process in a manner that violates the plaintiff’s rights. See id. at 539–40 (discussing the
good-faith defense, citing Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988) (permitting private
defendant to assert good-faith defense to a § 1983 action)). The contours of this defense are not
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In Lane, Joan Lane sued the Bank of Boston, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, two of its departments, and three individual employees
of those departments for copyright infringement of her compilation
database of certain public financial information.362 The Commonwealth,
its departments, and the employees filed a motion to dismiss, asserting
their state sovereign immunity.363 The court granted the motion with
respect to the Commonwealth, its departments, and the individual
employees in their official capacities, finding that they enjoyed absolute
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.364 The court then turned to
the employees’ assertion of qualified immunity from the suit against
them in their personal capacities.365 The court reviewed the law of
qualified immunity, particularly the standard for when a right is “clearly
defined” under Harlow.366 The court then addressed the defendants’
argument for qualified immunity:
[D]efendants argue that they remain protected by qualified
immunity because the laws of copyrightability of compilations,
as applied to documents such as Lane’s, were not clearly
established at the time the defendants allegedly violated the
plaintiff’s rights.
....
Defendants assert that there is a split in authority regarding
the exact interest which is protected in compilations, and on that
basis argues [sic] that the confusion protects their qualified
immunity.367

entirely clear, but it is a subjective, fact-based analysis that is generally limited to cases (1)
involving private defendants, where (2) the alleged underlying offense (such as malicious
prosecution) permits a good-faith defense. See id. Patent suits against researchers at state
universities are against state officials, and the patent laws do not recognize good faith as a defense
to infringement; consequently, the good-faith defense is not implicated. Or perhaps the court simply
used careless language, and actually intended only to delay its decision on qualified immunity until
it could be decided on the facts of the case.
362. Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 687 F. Supp. 11, 12–13 (D. Mass. 1988), aff’d, 871 F.2d
166 (1st Cir. 1989).
363. Id.
364. Id. at 14–15. On interlocutory appeal, this part of the ruling was affirmed by the First
Circuit. Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989). The appeal did not
address qualified immunity.
365. Lane, 687 F. Supp. at 15–17.
366. Id. at 15–16.
367. Id. at 15–16, 17.
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Thus, the court’s analysis focused on whether Lane’s particular
copyright was well established.368 The court ultimately concluded that
the law was clear that such compilations were copyrightable, and
therefore the qualified immunity defense failed on the particular facts of
the case.369 However, the court did not reject the application of a
qualified immunity defense in a copyright case on its face; it merely
concluded the defense was inapplicable in Lane’s particular factual
situation.370 The court did not directly address the issue of whether
reasonable persons in the position of defendants would have had a goodfaith belief that they were not, in fact, violating a clearly established
right by infringing Lane’s copyright and whether that belief would have
enabled them to assert qualified immunity. This omission likely occurred
because the defendants couched their defense in terms of the general
clarity of the coverage of a copyright in a compilation.371
Finally, in Chavez, Denise Chavez sued Arte Publico Press and one of
its employees for copyright infringement.372 The court noted that Arte
Publico Press was part of, and “legally indistinguishable from,” the
University of Houston, which was owned and operated by the State of
Texas.373 The individual defendant was “a University employee who at
all times relevant acted on its behalf.”374 The defendants moved to
dismiss, asserting their respective sovereign immunities.375 The court
held that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act had validly abrogated
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, and therefore Arte Publico
was not entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a defense (at least as to
any infringements that occurred after the effective date of the
Clarification Act).376 It then turned its attention to the employee’s
368. Id. at 16–17.
369. Id.
370. See id. at 15–17.
371. See id.
372. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 540 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Univ. of
Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996), rev’d on remand, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 541.
376. Id. at 546–47. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in the case, vacated the
Fifth Circuit’s decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision in Seminole Tribe.
Univ. of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996). While the case was on remand to the Fifth
Circuit, the Court issued its Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank decisions. Chavez v. Arte
Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 603. (5th Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Univ. of Houston v. Chavez,
517 U.S. 1184 (1996), rev’d on remand, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit concluded
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assertion of qualified immunity from suit against him in his personal
capacity.377 The court observed that the contractual provision that was at
the heart of the case was ambiguous.378 It therefore concluded,
“[b]ecause the licensing contract was reasonably susceptible to two
interpretations, one of which renders [the employee’s] alleged act
perfectly legal, he is entitled to qualified immunity.”379
Lane and Chavez are easily reconciled. In both cases, the court looked
to the facts of the particular case to determine whether the state official
was entitled to assert a claim of qualified immunity; the specific facts
merely led to opposite outcomes. Furthermore, both cases can be
reconciled with Kersavage, at least under the Kersavage court’s original
formulation. In all three cases, the application of qualified immunity
turned on whether the employee should reasonably have known of the
infringement. In Chavez and Lane, which were copyright cases, the facts
were clear enough that the issue could be easily decided at an early
stage. In Kersavage, a much more complicated patent case, making such
a determination at an early stage was proportionately more difficult. The
court in Kersavage therefore concluded it could not, as a matter of law,
decide whether reasonable persons in the position of the defendants
would have known they were violating a clearly established right by
infringing the patent. It accordingly decided to postpone resolution of
the issue until after further factual development through litigation. In the
court’s view, because the defendant needed to submit to further
litigation, the defendant could not properly be said to enjoy “qualified
immunity” from suit.380 As the court recast the analysis, however, the
defendant could still enjoy a more factually dependent “good-faith
immunity.”381 Although the court’s decision on reconsideration was
confused on this issue, from a practical standpoint, the only real
difference between the two inquiries is in their timing, and thus the
amount of litigation involved.

that Congress lacked the power under the intellectual property clause to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, and therefore the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act was invalid and Arte Publico was
entitled to assert sovereign immunity. Id. at 608. The court did not revisit the qualified immunity
issue.
377. Chavez, 59 F.3d at 547.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Kersavage v. Univ. Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
381. Id. at 1331–32.
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Willful Infringement

Although these prior cases addressed qualified immunity in the
intellectual property context, they did not do so in detail or with a view
to creating a cohesive doctrine. In light of Florida Prepaid, developing
such a doctrine has assumed greater importance. This development must
begin with the existing law on qualified immunity in § 1983 cases, as
elaborated in Harlow and its extensive progeny.382 However, these cases
have created a morass of law on the application of qualified immunity,
and the contours of the doctrine are unclear.383 Furthermore, the doctrine
does not lend itself to direct application in the intellectual property
context. Thus, courts attempting to analyze qualified immunity in the
intellectual property context will need to develop their own test. I
propose that qualified immunity should apply when appropriate in
intellectual property cases and that the applicable test should be based on
the existing willful infringement doctrines found in both patent and
copyright law. In practice, these doctrines establish a test that in many
ways bears a striking resemblance to that established by the Supreme
Court in Harlow, and thus they can serve as an excellent starting place
for developing a parallel test in intellectual property suits. These willful
infringement doctrines also provide a ready-made body of law that can
assist the courts in addressing qualified immunity, obviating the need to
develop an entirely new body of law.
a.

Willful Infringement in Patent Cases
The Patent Act’s damages provision states:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as
fixed by the court.

382. The Harlow decision and its objective standard for qualified immunity are discussed supra
Part III.A.4. See also infra note 389 & accompanying text (discussing later interpretation of
Harlow).
383. See 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.06[B]; see also supra Part III.A.4 (discussing
Harlow and its objective standard for qualified immunity); infra note 389 & accompanying text
(discussing later interpretation of Harlow); infra notes 398–400 & accompanying text (discussing
Harlow’s implementation of the objective test).
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When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall
assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages
up to three times the amount found or assessed.384
The Patent Act further provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”385
In practice, trebling of damages and the award of attorney fees
typically occurs when the infringement is found to be “willful.”386 The
primary criterion in determining whether an infringement is willful is
“whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would
prudently conduct himself with any confidence that a court might hold
the patent invalid or not infringed.”387 Thus, a court assessing whether a
researcher has committed willful infringement must address much the
same issue as it would in assessing whether the researcher is entitled to
claim qualified immunity—whether a reasonable person in the position
of the researcher would have known that he or she was infringing a
clearly established patent right.
At first glance, equating an objective standard based on what a
reasonable person would know with a more individualized standard—
such as willfulness—that takes into account the state of mind of the
infringer might seem problematic. However, in practice, the willfulness
standard is applied in a way that fits fairly nicely with how the qualified
immunity standard is applied. In assessing willfulness, courts first look
to the threshold issue of whether the infringer knew of the patent. If not,
then the infringement could not have been willful—logically, a person
cannot deliberately infringe a patent of which he or she had no
knowledge.388 This is a purely subjective standard, based on what the
accused infringer actually knew, making it seem an ill fit with the
objective test applied in qualified immunity. However, the Supreme
Court has noted in another context that applying the objective test for
qualified immunity will often require inquiry into the information
possessed by the party asserting the defense:
384. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (emphasis added).
385. Id. § 285.
386. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2004). For a thorough exposition of the issues of enhanced damages, attorney fees, and
willful patent infringement, see 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 180, § 20.03[4][b], [c].
387. Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
388. See 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 180, § 20.03[4][b][v][H], at 20-408 (stating, “[a]
person cannot be a willful infringer of a patent if he has no knowledge of the patent,” and collecting
cases).
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[T]he determination whether it was objectively legally
reasonable to conclude that a given search was supported by
probable cause or exigent circumstances will often require
examination of the information possessed by the searching
officials. But contrary to the [plaintiffs’] assertion, this does not
reintroduce into qualified immunity analysis the inquiry into
officials’ subjective intent that Harlow sought to minimize. The
relevant question in this case, for example, is the objective
(albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could
have believed Anderson’s warrantless search to be lawful, in
light of clearly established law and the information the
searching officers possessed. Anderson’s subjective beliefs
about the search are irrelevant.389
Thus, a threshold inquiry into the accused infringer’s knowledge of the
patent is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s objective test for
qualified immunity.
Once the threshold issue of knowledge of the patent is passed, the
core of the willfulness inquiry is an objective inquiry into the
reasonableness of the accused infringer’s conduct. The Federal Circuit
has stated this willful infringement test in various ways, all with the
same basic emphasis on the objective reasonableness of the accused
infringer’s conduct. For example, as noted above, in Ryco, Inc. v. AgBag Corp.,390 the court stated, “[t]he test is whether, under all the
circumstances, a reasonable person would prudently conduct himself
with any confidence that a court might hold the patent invalid or not
infringed.”391 Later, in State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries,
Inc.,392 the court used the formulation: “To establish willful
infringement, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant acted with no reasonable basis for believing it had the
right to do so.”393 In Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.,394
the court expressed the standard thus: “The issue of ‘willful’
infringement measures the infringing behavior, in the circumstances in
which the infringer acted, against an objective standard of reasonable
389. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
390. 857 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
391. Id. at 1428.
392. 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
393. Id. at 1581.
394. 78 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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commercial behavior in the same circumstances. Willful infringement is
thus a measure of reasonable commercial behavior in the context of the
tort of patent infringement.”395
Because “infringement” is effectively the violation of an established
right (the patent right), this objective inquiry into the reasonableness of
the defendant’s conduct using the willfulness analysis nicely parallels
that required for qualified immunity under Harlow. If the infringement
was willful—that is, if a reasonable person in the position of the accused
infringer would have known that he or she was infringing a patent—then
the accused infringer has “violate[d a] clearly established statutory . . .
right[] of which a reasonable person would have known.” Conversely, if
a reasonable person would not have known that he or she was infringing
a patent, then the infringement was not willful and the accused infringer
has not “violate[d a] clearly established statutory . . . right[] of which a
reasonable person would have known.” In the former case, the infringer
should not be able to claim qualified immunity, while in the latter he or
she should be entitled to claim it.
Of course, the parallel between the two doctrines is not perfect. While
the willfulness inquiry is largely objective, it does incorporate subjective
elements relating to the behavior of the accused infringer that are
inconsistent with the objective inquiry mandated under Harlow. For
example, the Federal Circuit has stated:
Although various criteria have been stated for determining
“willful infringement,” . . . the primary consideration is whether
the infringer, acting in good faith and upon due inquiry, had
sound reason to believe that it had the right to act in the manner
that was found to be infringing. . . . Thus precedent displays the
consistent theme of whether a prudent person would have had
sound reason to believe that the patent was not infringed or was
invalid or unenforceable, and would be so held if litigated.396
However, later in the same opinion, the court noted:
[T]he issue of willfulness not only raises issues of
reasonableness and prudence, but is often accompanied by
questions of intent, belief, and credibility . . . .397

395. Id. at 1583.
396. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Adv. Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464–65 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
397. Id. at 1465; see also Read Corp. v. Portec Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–28 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(spelling out a multifactor test for enhanced damages, of which many factors are subjective).
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The latter set of subjective considerations is of course outside the scope
of the objective test set forth in Harlow. Thus, a court adapting the
willful infringement test for use as a qualified immunity test would have
to decide whether it should consider these additional factors, or limit
itself to the objective portion of the test.
Historically, the Supreme Court took such subjective factors (or at
least ones very much like them) into account in assessing qualified
immunity.398 Then, in Harlow, the Court was searching for a mechanism
to rid the courts of vexatious, non-meritorious suits against state officials
at an early stage, without the need for extensive discovery or trial.399 The
Court concluded that the subjective factors were the main culprit in
slowing down the process, as they were factual in nature and thus
typically required a trial to resolve them. The Court therefore eliminated
those factors in the interest of streamlining the procedure.400 However,
as discussed below,401 even the objective portion of the willfulness
analysis in intellectual property cases is very fact-intensive, almost
certainly requiring a trial to resolve. Thus, meeting Harlow’s goal of
streamlining the process is likely impossible in the intellectual property
context anyway, and so the court might as well use all of the information
at its disposal, both subjective and objective.
Using willfulness as the touchstone for qualified immunity has the
advantage of making use of a large, ready-made body of existing case
law, as willfulness is now commonly asserted in patent cases.402 This
existing law can be easily adapted to the qualified immunity issue,
obviating the need to develop a new body of law to address the issue.403
In most willfulness cases, the key issue has been whether the accused
infringer obtained an opinion letter regarding infringement from an
attorney.404 Accordingly, such opinion letters should also be important in
asserting a qualified immunity defense that is based on the willfulness
standard. In general, entities will seek such opinion letters as soon as
398. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–17 (1982). (discussing the then-prevailing test
that incorporated subjective and objective elements); see also 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22,
¶ 2.06[B] (discussing pre-Harlow law); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.3, at 529–30 (same).
399. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814–18.
400. See id. at 814–19.
401. See infra Part IV.C.
402. See generally 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 180, § 20.03[4][b], [c].
403. See id. (discussing this body of law and collecting cases).
404. See id. § 20.03[4][b][v][C], [D] (discussing the role of opinion letters in willfulness
determinations).
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they become aware that their conduct may implicate the patent of
another. An opinion letter will typically assert that the entity’s conduct
does not infringe the patent and/or that the patent is invalid (and
therefore cannot be infringed).405 However, the existence of the letter
alone is not sufficient. The letter must be competently prepared (that is,
it must be prepared with full knowledge of all relevant facts and it must
address all issues relevant to infringement, including infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents),406 the entity must actually rely on it, and
this reliance must be reasonable.407 If these conditions are met, then the
letter will provide a full defense to willfulness, even if it is later revealed
to have been incorrect, and even if, at trial, the entity does not ultimately
assert any of the grounds set forth in the letter.408
Obtaining and relying on an opinion of counsel from the university
counsel’s office is therefore an excellent expedient for a researcher who
may be infringing a patent and who wants to preserve his or her
qualified immunity defense.409 However, practical considerations may
make this path significantly less useful. Preparing competent
infringement opinions is an expensive and time-consuming task.410 In a
large university—where many faculty are each using a wide variety of
different, constantly changing, potentially patented techniques—
generating all the necessary opinions would be prohibitively
expensive.411 Thus, having universal opinion coverage is impracticable,
if not impossible. However, opinions could still be prepared in a
relatively limited number of cases, such as where a researcher receives a
405. See Marta E. Gross & Emily L. Rapalino, Patent Opinion Basics, 825 PLI/PAT 133, 142–46
(2005) (discussing “Non-Infringement Positions” and “Invalidity Positions”).
406. See id. at 153–54.
407. See id. at 152.
408. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“While an
opinion of counsel letter is an important factor in determining the willfulness of infringement, its
importance does not depend upon its legal correctness. Indeed, the question arises only where
counsel was wrong. Rather, counsel’s opinion must be thorough enough, as combined with other
factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not
infringed, or unenforceable.”). See generally 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 180,
§ 20.03[4][b][v][D] (“Counsel Opinion Competence Issues”).
409. Assuming, of course, that the university counsel’s office employs attorneys competent to
prepare infringement letters. More likely, the counsel’s office would retain outside counsel for the
task.
410. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1092 (2003) (discussing the high cost of opinion letters).
411. Indeed, given the amount of time necessary to do each opinion properly, the task is also
quite likely to be physically impossible.
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letter from a patentee putting the researcher on notice of potential
infringement liability, or where a researcher’s program is built around a
single potentially protected technique.
Historically, an attorney opinion was almost a necessity in avoiding a
finding of willfulness.412 Indeed, the Federal Circuit applied a rule that if
the infringer did not present an opinion, or indicated that it had such a
letter but declined to provide it, the trier of fact was to presume that such
a letter was unfavorable.413 However, the Federal Circuit removed that
presumption in 2004 in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge
GmbH v. Dana Corp.414 Thus, opinions of counsel are now less of a
necessity for researchers at state universities. Researchers like Dr. Little
who have a good-faith belief that they are not infringing a patent, or that
the patent is invalid, no longer risk liability simply because the
university did not provide an opinion to support that belief.415 Of course,
under the Supreme Court’s standard from Harlow, their belief must still
be reasonable; they just no longer need an opinion to avoid liability.
Such reliance on attorney opinions is not a novel proposition in the
qualified immunity context. Several courts have accepted reliance on
advice of counsel as meeting the defendant’s burden on the “clearly
established right” prong of the qualified immunity defense in civil rights
cases,416 although not all courts agree.417
b.

Willful Infringement in Copyright Cases

A similar analysis applies to suits for copyright infringement, as
copyright law also has a willfulness doctrine and concomitant body of
case law. In copyright cases, willfulness determinations are generally
made in the context of statutory damages, which a successful plaintiff
may choose in lieu of actual damages.418 The statutory damages
412. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 410, at 1091 (“In patent law, the Federal Circuit has
effectively hinged the question of intent on whether the accused infringer obtained and believed a
competent opinion of counsel.”).
413. See id. (“Failure to obtain such an opinion creates a presumption of willfulness, and failure
to disclose an opinion in court after it was obtained creates a presumption that the opinion was
unfavorable.” (footnotes omitted)).
414. 383 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
415. See Gross & Rapalino, supra note 405, at 162–64 (discussing the impact of Knorr-Bremse).
416. See 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.09[A], at 2-386 to 2-387 & n.11 (collecting
cases).
417. See id. ¶ 2.09[A], at 2-386 to 2-387 & n.10 (collecting cases).
418. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000) (permitting the copyright owner to elect to recover
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provision allows for enhanced damages “where the copyright owner
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that the infringement
was committed willfully.”419 In practice, the court determines willfulness
in a copyright case much the same way as in a patent case:
[O]ne who has been notified that his conduct constitutes
copyright infringement, but who reasonably and in good faith
believes the contrary, is not “willful” for these purposes. But one
who “recklessly disregards” a copyright holder’s rights, even if
lacking actual knowledge of infringement, may be subject to
enhanced damages.420
However, asserting qualified immunity in the copyright context
should be much easier than in the patent context. Copyright’s well
established but poorly defined fair use defense421 leaves substantial room
for researchers at state universities defending copyright suits to argue
that they believed that their teaching or research constituted fair use of
the copyrighted material. Even if this belief was misguided, the fair use
defense’s ambiguous contours will make it difficult for the copyright
holder to demonstrate that reliance on the defense was unreasonable and
that the accused infringer therefore had the requisite willful intent.
Furthermore, the fair use defense has particular power in the academic
context, because academic use is one of the canonical categories of fair
use as defined in the statute.422 Therefore, a court will likely have a
difficult time finding any belief of noninfringement to be so
unreasonable as to constitute willful infringement. The fair use doctrine
thus makes a qualified immunity defense particularly strong in the
copyright context.

statutory damages). One caveat to this rule should be noted: The copyright holder is only entitled to
elect statutory damages if the copyright was properly registered prior to the infringement. See 17
U.S.C. § 412.
419. Id. § 504(c)(2).
420. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 182, § 14.04[B][3][a], at 14-79 (footnotes omitted);
see also id. § 14.04[B][3][a], at 14-79 to 14-82 (collecting cases, and also discussing the role of
opinion of counsel in negating willfulness).
421. Fair use is discussed in more detail supra Part III.B.2.b.
422. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use applies to “purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research”
(emphasis added)); see also Menell, supra note 13, at 1407 & n.34 (suggesting that qualified
immunity might apply to certain types of copyright infringement “for research or educational
purposes” and noting that such uses might be justified as fair uses).
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Problems with Willfulness in Qualified Immunity

However, using willfulness as the touchstone for the qualified
immunity defense does have some problems.423 The most significant
problem is that one of the major benefits of an immunity defense is to
free the official from having to defend the suit by disposing of it at an
early stage. One of the Supreme Court’s primary concerns in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald was that the subjective prong of the existing test for qualified
immunity required an extensive factual inquiry, and was thus unsuited to
resolution at an early stage of the proceedings.424 Because the purpose of
qualified immunity was to free the official from the need to defend a
suit, a slow, fact-dependent analysis was contrary to the goals of the
defense.425 As the Fifth Circuit noted in Chavez, “This [qualified]
immunity is not merely immunity from liability, but is also immunity
from suit, and it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial.”426 The objective standard introduced in Harlow was intended
to make the analysis of qualified immunity faster and easier, minimizing
harm to the official and disruptions to the government.427
The willfulness doctrine does not lend itself to such rapid resolution,
particularly in patent cases. Applying the doctrine is very complex and
fact-intensive, and proper assessment of the defense takes time. The
process might be simplified and accelerated if its primary basis is an
opinion letter of counsel, but even in such cases, establishing that the
opinion is competent and covers all the relevant bases is still timeconsuming.428 Furthermore, in the context of the litigation, performing
the willfulness analysis first typically does not make sense. After all, the
researcher can only be guilty of willful infringement if he or she
infringed in the first place. A researcher could have the worst opinion
letter in the world (or none), and even believe that he or she was
infringing, but ultimately if the patent was invalid or the research

423. These and other problems with qualified immunity in the intellectual property context lead
me to propose an absolute immunity for researchers at state universities accused of intellectual
property infringements. See infra Part V.
424. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982).
425. See id.
426. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted), vacated
sub nom. Univ. of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996), rev’d on remand, 204 F.3d 601 (5th
Cir. 2000).
427. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–19.
428. Preparation of opinion letters is discussed supra notes 404–11 and accompanying text.
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activity non-infringing, then the researcher’s conduct cannot be called
“willful.”429 Of course, a court is free to conduct the litigation in
whatever order it sees fit, so it can conduct the willfulness-based
qualified immunity analysis first if it appears to be the easiest way to
dispose of a particular case.
Ultimately, the complexity of the willfulness inquiry may not present
any significant practical difficulties. Despite the Supreme Court’s
intentions, in practice, civil rights litigation produces a similar result
much of the time.430 Many civil rights suits require a significant and
time-consuming factual analysis before the court can reach a decision on
qualified immunity.431 Furthermore, in patent and copyright cases, courts
will need to conduct infringement analyses as part of their proceedings
under Ex parte Young anyway. If a court finds infringement, it can then
conduct a willfulness analysis. In this situation, the researcher’s position
effectively becomes “double (or triple) or nothing”—if the infringement
is found to be willful, then the patentee will not only get damages, it will
also get enhanced damages; if the infringement is found not to be
willful, then the patentee will get no damages because the researcher will
be able to assert qualified immunity.
Thus, under current law, researchers at state universities like Dr.
Little should be entitled to assert qualified immunity when they are
accused of patent or copyright infringement. By analogy to § 1983’s
standard of official immunity for conduct that “does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known,” they should be granted qualified immunity
when their conduct does not violate a clearly established intellectual
property right. Whether such a violation of a clearly established

429. On the other hand, the same argument applies in the civil rights context—it ultimately does
not matter whether the law was clearly established if the search was legal in the first place. The
issue does not seem to cause any problems there.
430. See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of
Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1997) (“This Article examines and
criticizes the Supreme Court’s paradoxical approach to crafting qualified immunity law, which
simultaneously encourages resolution of the defense on summary judgment and shapes the doctrine
to ensure an almost inevitable factual inquiry that precludes pretrial termination of civil rights
claims.”).
431. Cf., e.g., Manion v. Mich. Bd. Med., 765 F.2d 590, 598 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding defendants
entitled to assert qualified immunity even though whether it applied could not be resolved on
summary judgment), overruled on other grounds by Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269 (6th Cir.
1992).
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intellectual property right has occurred should be assessed in this context
by ascertaining whether the infringement was willful.432
V.

TAKING IT FURTHER: ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

Most commentators analyzing Florida Prepaid have focused on ways
to avoid it or limit its effects in order to hold the states liable for their
intellectual property rights infringements.433 In many contexts,
particularly where, as in Florida Prepaid, the state is competing
economically with private entities, this approach makes sense. However,
from the perspective of researchers at state universities, this approach
appears precisely wrong. Rather than looking for ways to increase
liability on the states and state actors, we should seek to decrease
liability for researchers at state universities.
Qualified immunity is an important defense for researchers at state
universities accused of patent or copyright infringement. Indeed, it is the
best defense current law permits. However, as discussed above in Part
III.B.1, its availability in intellectual property cases is not entirely clear.
Furthermore, even assuming that qualified immunity is available, it does
not go far enough because it will be expensive to assert and will still
leave a substantial risk of liability. Therefore, the best approach to the
immunity issue is to discard current law entirely and move in a new
direction: Rather than limiting researchers at state universities to the
relatively limited qualified immunity they are entitled to assert under
current law, Congress should change the laws to grant these researchers
absolute immunity from liability for infringements committed in the
course of their academic research. Such an absolute immunity would
help resolve many of the difficulties presented by qualified immunity
and, properly limited, it also has the potential to solve certain other
doctrinal problems presented by the existing intellectual property laws.
The overarching vision behind such proposed absolute immunity is
this: Society needs a limited sphere in which those who are not directly
motivated by profit can use patented inventions without fear of
liability.434 Such a sphere would allow researchers free rein to explore

432. Professor Richard Bone makes a similar point in passing regarding the use of the willful
infringement doctrine in the context of qualified immunity, although he places it under an Ex parte
Young analysis. See Bone, supra note 164, at 1484.
433. See supra Part I.B.6; see also, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 13; Berman et al., supra note 13;
Menell, supra note 13; Neufeld, supra note 114; Cotner, supra note 114.
434. See JOHN P. WALSH, CHARLENE CHO & WESLEY M. COHEN, PATENTS, MATERIAL

354

PULSINELLI.DOC

5/22/2007 7:47:14 PM

Freedom to Explore
the full potential of a patented technology, perhaps taking it in new and
unanticipated directions. Freed from fear of infringement liability,
researchers might figure out how to apply the protected technology to
new questions, or simply work on improving the invention itself, or do
something totally unexpected with it. Dr. Little could continue her
research into the cloning of agricultural animals without the fear that one
of the many companies with a patent on a small step in her protocol
might attempt to shut her down at any moment. All of this research
would inure to the benefit of the public and thereby improve the
common good.
This Part explores the implications of a legislative grant of absolute
immunity against intellectual property infringement for researchers at
state universities. Part V.A describes the problems presented by the
present regime, which at best grants only a qualified immunity. Part V.B
then explains how these problems, as well as several other important
problems of the present intellectual property laws, would be addressed
by granting statutory absolute immunity to researchers at state
universities. Part V.C explores the limits of the statutory grant of
immunity, concluding that it should be limited to researchers at state
universities and not extended to researchers at other types of institutions.
Finally, Part V.D examines the possible ways in which such an absolute
immunity for researchers at state universities might be implemented, and
what the terms of such an immunity should be.
A.

Disadvantages of Qualified Immunity

Absolute immunity would solve some of the problems presented by
the more limited qualified immunity. First, asserting qualified immunity
will obviously require engaging the services of an attorney,435 which can
TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 3–4 (2005), available at
http://tigger.uic.edu/~jwalsh/WalshChoCohenFinal050922.pdf (“A key reason for the negligible
impact of patents on the conduct of academic biomedical research is that researchers largely ignore
them. While such disregard for IP may, for the time being, minimize the social costs that might
otherwise emerge due to restricted access, it is still important that the institutional environment
maintain a free space for academic research.”); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 307, at
110 (discussing the problems that patents create for academic research and stating “[w]e believe
these circumstances may justify providing some sort of safety valve” for academic research). See
generally id. at 108–17 (section entitled “Shield Some Research Uses of Patent Inventions from
Infringement Liability” within chapter entitled “Seven Recommendations for a 21st-Century Patent
System”).
435. University counsel would be unsuitable for this task, because (1) university counsel is
unlikely to have the necessary expertise to try a complex patent case and (2) the counsel’s duty is to
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quickly become expensive. Although in many cases these fees may be
covered by the state through an indemnification clause,436 in other cases
they may not be, leaving the researcher in the difficult position of having
to pay his or her own very expensive legal bills. Furthermore, even if the
state pays for the defense, it will still consume large amounts of the
researcher’s time, diverting him or her from performing actual research.
If the immunity were absolute, however, such a defense would be
unnecessary—personal-capacity suits would not be filed in the first
place, as they would be inherently unwinnable. Similarly, absolute
immunity would solve the problem of having to conduct a full trial to
determine whether an immunity defense applied. As the Fifth Circuit
observed in Chavez, “[t]his [qualified] immunity is not merely immunity
from liability, but is also immunity from suit, and it is effectively lost if
a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”437 Absolute immunity
accomplishes exactly that goal, as it can be resolved easily without a
trial on the underlying factual issues—it effectively equals immunity
from suit.
B.

Advantages of Absolute Immunity

Absolute immunity can also help address some problems created by
the intellectual property laws themselves. First, absolute immunity
would enhance the information-sharing function of patents.438 Basing the
qualified immunity defense on the willfulness of infringement creates
the perverse incentive for researchers to embrace a general policy of
avoiding looking at patents, so that they can maintain their good-faith
belief that they do not infringe any patents. Maintaining this belief
allows them to assert that any infringement is unintentional, because—as
noted above—infringement of an unknown patent cannot be willful.439

the university, such that he or she would be subject to potentially irreconcilable conflicts of interest
in attempting to represent researchers at state universities in their personal capacities.
436. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text (discussing indemnification).
437. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted), vacated
sub nom. Univ. of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996), rev’d on remand, 204 F.3d 601 (5th
Cir. 2000).
438. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 410, at 1100–02 & n.45 (discussing the informationdissemination function of patents); see also Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d
1046, 1071–72 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing the informationsharing function of patents and observing that “[i]nformation dissemination is a critical purpose of
the patent system”).
439. See supra note 388 and accompanying text.
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However, one of the main functions of patents is to disseminate
information for use by others, and to avoid duplication of work that has
already been completed. The patent laws, particularly the § 112
requirements of enablement, written description, and best mode,440 are
specifically designed to force the patentee to share information with the
public as the quid pro quo for receiving valuable patent protection.441 A
doctrine that discourages study of all this information contained in
patents thus contradicts one of the fundamental functions of patents.
Indeed, this criticism has been leveled at the willfulness doctrine as a
whole—enhancing damages for willful infringement leads perversely to
less knowledge being gleaned from patent disclosures.442 Granting
absolute immunity would remove this worry, freeing researchers to look
at patents and learn from them, thereby saving considerable time, effort,
and expense.
Absolute immunity might also help address a more fundamental
problem that has crept into modern intellectual property law: the erosion
of the public domain. The recent trend in intellectual property law has
been, almost without exception, toward strengthening and expanding the
rights of intellectual property holders.443 The flip side is, of course, a
matching decrease in the rights of the public, and a corresponding
impoverishment of the public domain.444

440. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
441. See supra note 315 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Newman’s exposition on this
issue in dissent).
442. See, e.g., Lemley & Tangri, supra note 410, at 1100–03. Lemley and Tangri point out that
“[a]lthough patent policy presumes that the public learns from patents, the willfulness game creates
a strong incentive not to read patents.” Id. at 1100. Further, “experienced patent lawyers often
advise their clients to avoid reading patents in order to avoid liability for willfulness.” Id. at 1102.
Another commentator has also argued that “[d]ue to the Federal Circuit’s willful infringement rules,
however, many innovators now avoid reading patents to protect themselves from treble damage
awards in infringement suits. These rules consequently undermine the disclosure function of the
patent system.” Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2007, 2017 (2005); see also id. at 2017–23.
443. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (formalizing the extension of patentable subject matter to include business methods and
computer software); Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–305 (2000)
(extending the length of the copyright term from life plus 50 years to life plus 70 years); Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., & 35 U.S.C. (2000)) (providing penalties for tampering with
digital rights management technology); Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1125, 1127 (2000) (providing a federal cause of action for dilution of famous trademarks).
444. This subject is discussed extensively elsewhere, and the examples presented in this Article
represent only a small sampling of the topic. For an introduction to the topic, see James Boyle,
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For example, in the patent realm, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Madey v. Duke University445 severely curtailed the traditional
understanding of the contours of the experimental use exemption,
declaring illegal a great swath of academic and other non-profit research
commonly believed to be permitted.446 In assessing Duke University’s
liability for infringing a patent owned by a scientist formerly employed
by the university, the court stated:
In short, regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is
engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act
is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business
and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the
very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.447
Furthermore, the range of patentable subject matter has been expanding,
first to encompass living matter448 and, more recently, to cover areas
previously thought ineligible for protection, such as business methods
and computer software.449 Damages in intellectual property suits have

Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 2003) (introducing
and summarizing the articles in a volume dedicated to discussion of the public domain). Professor
Boyle also describes the first “Conference on the Public Domain” held at Duke Law School in 2001.
See id. at 1–2. A webcast of the conference is archived at http://law.duke.edu/pd/realcast.htm. For a
further sampling of the literature, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital
Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813
(2001); Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56 (2006);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD
(2001); Mary LaFrance, Steam Shovels and Lipstick: Trademarks, Greed, and the Public Domain, 6
NEV. L.J. 447 (Winter 2005–2006); Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific
Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 519 (2006); Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public
Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 67 (2005). But cf. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 183, 183 (2004) (“Many believe intellectual property has overreached, and that
policymakers must respond. In this Essay, I argue that the critique may have merit, but private
parties are in some cases taking matters into their own hands.”).
445. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
446. See id. at 1362.
447. Id.
448. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
449. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (formalizing the extension of patentable subject matter to include business methods and
computer software). See generally Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 577 (1999) (examining this expansion of patentable subject matter and its negative impact on
the Patent & Trademark Office); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 1139 (1999) (criticizing this expansion of patentable subject matter beyond the traditional
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also been growing, increasing the consequences of a finding of
infringement and thereby reducing incentives to work at the edges of
protected areas.450
Another source of erosion of the public domain is the Bayh-Dole
Act.451 Under the Bayh-Dole Act, inventions funded by the federal
government, many of which formerly would have fallen into the public
domain, are now being patented by universities and other non-profit
institutions.452 Increased patenting by universities and other research
foundations pursuant to Bayh-Dole has accelerated the existing trend of
increased patenting in all sectors, a trend further fueled by the expanding
range of patentable subject matter.453 In turn, these numerous patents on
many small pieces of technology create “patent thickets” that are
difficult to navigate, and which might prevent any one user from getting
all the rights necessary to put the pieces together to create a useful
product or technique.454 Indeed, commentators in the field have coined
the term “tragedy of the anticommons” to describe the problem that may
technical realm and predicting its further expansion into other non-technical areas); Alan L.
Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1419 (predicting that the
expansion of patentable subject matter into the realm of the computer will have the effect of making
many other non-technological innovations patentable through their implementation on computers).
450. See MERGES, MENELL, & LEMLEY, supra note 187, at 350 (“The bottom line on patent
damages—whether based on lost profits or reasonable royalty—is that they are growing.” (citing
William O. Kerr & Gauri Prakash-Canjels, Patent Damages and Royalty Awards: The Convergence
of Economics and Law, 38 LES NOUVELLES 83 (2003))); see also id. at 347–50 (exploring “four
novel theories [that] have been used to increase damage awards in the past several years”); id. at
613 (noting implementation of enhanced damages for “counterfeiting” a copyrighted work);
NIMMER ET AL., supra note 182, at 603 (noting the increasing maximum amounts of copyright
statutory damages).
451. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117
and 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212, 301–307 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). For a fuller description of the BayhDole Act, its history, and some of its consequences, see generally Pulsinelli, supra note 298, and
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer
in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996).
452. See Pulsinelli, supra note 298, at 410; Eisenberg, supra note 451, at 1708–10. See generally,
e.g., Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University
Contribution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1731–32 (1996) (discussing the changes and benefits BayhDole has brought to university research).
453. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 292 (2003) (“The patenting trend accelerated
significantly, however, after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. . . . This almost ten-fold
increase in university patenting was significantly greater than the two-fold increase in overall
patenting during the same time period . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY,
supra note 187, at 123 (“The sheer number of patents being granted has increased roughly threefold
in the past 20 years . . . .”).
454. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 453, at 297 (using the term “patent thicket”).
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arise when too many rights in a particular technology are granted,
resulting in the underuse of that technology.455 With so many parties
claiming rights over pieces of the cloning protocol she is trying to
improve, Dr. Little and others in her field are quite likely to find
themselves facing just such an impenetrable thicket of patents that
threatens to choke off further research.
Similar trends toward expanding intellectual property rights also
operate in the copyright area. The repeated extension of the term of
copyright protection456 has kept many works protected that otherwise
would have fallen into the public domain, and thus been available to
serve as the raw materials of future works.457 Whole new areas of
copyrightable subject matter are being added, such as coverage for
sound recordings458 and architectural works.459 At the same time, new
rights are being created, such as the digital performance right for sound
recordings.460 Even works on which protection had lapsed are being
455. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). The phrase “tragedy of the
anticommons” is a reference to the classic description of the “tragedy of the commons.” See id. at
698 (citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)). Briefly, under
the “tragedy of the commons” identified by Professor Hardin, “people often overuse resources they
own in common because they have no incentive to conserve.” Id. Professors Heller and Eisenberg
observe that the converse may also be true, asserting that “a resource is prone to underuse in a
‘tragedy of the anticommons’ when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a
scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.” Id. Professors Heller and Eisenberg
are especially concerned that too many patent rights are being awarded in the biotechnology field,
particularly on “upstream” basic research that is needed to feed “downstream” applied research, and
that these patents are thus interfering with the progress of research in this area. Id.
456. The original term of copyright was 14 years, plus the possibility of a renewal term of 14
years, for a possible total of 28 years. The Copyright Act of 1909 extended the term to 28 years,
plus the possibility of a renewal term of 28 years, for a possible total of 56 years. The Copyright Act
of 1976 further extended the term to life of the author plus 50 years (or 75 years for entity authors).
The Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act added another 20 years, so the current term is life
plus 70 years (95 years for entity authors). See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 187, at
370–71 (tracing this historic development).
457. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 21–24 (2004) (describing how Walt
Disney developed cartoons from previous works available in the public domain; Walt Disney Co. is
one of the major driving forces behind the repeated extensions of copyright term).
458. See Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (adding, inter
alia, the section presently codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2000) (establishing “sound recordings”
as copyrightable subject matter)).
459. See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VII, 104 Stat.
5133, 5133–34 (1990) (adding, inter alia, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (establishing “architectural works”
as copyrightable subject matter)).
460. See Digital Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–39, 109 Stat. 336
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removed from the public domain by having their copyrights
“restored.”461
One of the biggest sources of erosion in the copyright area, and one
that often has direct impact on researchers at state universities, is the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act462 (DMCA). The DMCA has severely
restricted research into certain areas of digital protection because of the
fear of liability it engenders.463 For example, Dr. Edward Felten at
Princeton University, responding to the invitation of a group that
included the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),
cracked the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) protection scheme
used on digital music recordings. When Dr. Felton attempted to publish
his results, RIAA threatened suit under the DMCA.464 As many
commentators have noted, research into methods for thwarting
encryption methods are a very important part of ensuring that such
encryption methods are robust.465 Granting absolute immunity to
(adding, inter alia, 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (granting the copyright owner the right “in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission”)).
461. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (“Copyright in restored works”).
462. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., & 35 U.S.C.).
463. Briefly, the DMCA prohibits specific acts to circumvent technological measures controlling
access to a protected work, as well as creating or trafficking in devices that enable such
circumvention. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). It also prohibits creating or trafficking in devices that enable
circumvention of technological measures controlling use of a protected work, but not specific acts to
circumvent such measures. Id. § 1201(b). Further, it prohibits the falsification, removal, or alteration
of “copyright management information.” Id. § 1202. For a more thorough discussion of the DMCA
and its provisions, see, for example, Neil A. Benchell, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A
Review of the Law and the Court’s Interpretation, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1
(2002).
464. See Robin D. Gross, Digital Millennium Dark Ages, http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/
Felten_v_RIAA/20011107_eff_felten_article.html (Nov. 7, 2001). Dr. Felten and his team took part
in the Hack SDMI Challenge, a public challenge sponsored by the SDMI, a consortium of recording
industry and technology companies. See id. The Challenge was aimed at developing ways of
circumventing the digital protection methods used on digital music recordings. See id. Dr. Felten
and his team successfully cracked the SDMI protection scheme. See id. However, when they desired
to publish their work, the RIAA threatened suit under the DMCA, on the grounds that the
publication would teach others how to circumvent the copy protection scheme, in violation of
§ 1201(a). See id. Dr. Felten filed a declaratory judgment suit, alleging that such an action would
violate the First Amendment. See id. (citing Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., No. CV-012669 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2001)). The documents from the case are collected on the EFF web site at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/. The RIAA backed down and allowed Dr. Felten
and his team to publish their paper. See id. However, the RIAA gave its sanction to only that
particular paper; it expressly reserved its right to file suit under the DMCA for any future papers.
See id.
465. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18
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researchers at state universities would enable these researchers to carry
out this important research into encryption and decryption, without fear
of liability under the DMCA.466
In a related vein, the DMCA has also operated to prevent what would
otherwise be fair uses of copyrighted material that is protected by digital
means. Ostensibly in the interest of preserving the fair use of protected
works, the DMCA does not prohibit circumventing technical barriers
that prevent the use of the protected work467 (as opposed to
circumventing technical barriers that prevent access to the protected
work, which is prohibited468). However, it does prohibit the manufacture
of and trafficking in any tools that would make such circumvention
possible.469 Thus, while fair use is theoretically preserved, it is available
only to those with sufficiently advanced decryption skills that they can
break the protection scheme by themselves. Any attempt by others to
assist with this task—including by publishing a method of doing so—
would be a violation of the DMCA.470 However, this deficiency could be
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501 (2003). Professor Liu explains:
Indeed, according to commentators, the DMCA will actually make encryption technologies
more susceptible to such attacks, since copyright owners will not be able to improve their
systems using the results of open and legitimate encryption research. That is, by chilling
legitimate encryption research, the DMCA will simply drive encryption research into less
legitimate channels. Weaknesses discovered by attackers will not be published and reviewed in
academic journals or on the Internet. Consequently, individuals and companies will never be
confident that any proposed or implemented systems are robust and secure.
Id. at 512; see also Gross, supra note 464 (“In addition to threatening freedom of expression and
scientific advancement, the DMCA actually weakens the security of computer products. As any
computer security professional will tell you, it is by testing systems and publicly discussing
discovered weaknesses that the art of computer security moves forward. In an electronic world that
is ever more dependent upon technological measures to maintain the safety and protection of
individuals bank, medical, email, and other private information, driving this crucial science
underground is dangerously irresponsible, fostering public insecurity.”).
466. Violations of the DMCA are not copyright infringements, even though the relevant portions
of the DMCA are codified with the Copyright Act. See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note
187, at 572 (“[V]iolations of the DMCA are not acts of copyright infringement, but separate
offenses.”). Thus, the proposed absolute immunity statute will have to be drafted to include
immunity from violations of the DMCA explicitly.
467. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b). This aspect of the DMCA’s impact on fair use is discussed in
MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 187, at 569–70.
468. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
469. See id. § 1201(b).
470. See id.; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)
(affirming injunction against publication of DeCSS code that permitted computer users to decrypt
and use material recorded on DVDs). This problem was also the subject of a bill introduced into the
House of Representatives in 2005. See Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net
Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2005, H.R. 4536, 109th Cong. (2005).
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overcome if researchers at state universities were granted absolute
immunity for violations of the DMCA. These researchers would be able
to do the research necessary to unlock the encryption schemes and then
disseminate the necessary tools so that others can exercise their longstanding right to make fair use of the copyrighted material, a right that
the DMCA would otherwise block for all but the most technology-savvy
users.
These trends, along with many others, have severely eroded the public
domain. Granting researchers at state universities absolute immunity
against suits for intellectual property infringement would be an
important check on this growth of intellectual property rights. Strong
rights are an important source of incentives to create new inventions and
new works, but rights that are overly strong diminish the value of these
new inventions and works by making them inaccessible for further
development and study.471 Attempting to solve this problem by granting
broad freedom to infringe intellectual property rights would likely
severely jeopardize future progress. However, creating a limited sphere
in which infringement is permitted can release some of the growing
pressure of increased rights, by allowing important research to proceed
in a limited, non-commercial fashion while still preventing widespread
commercial infringement.
C.

Parties Protected by Absolute Immunity

One reaction to this argument might be that it proves too much—if
allowing infringement is so helpful, why not extend it to everyone? That
argument, of course, goes too far—intellectual property rights serve
important functions in encouraging innovation, and allowing widespread
infringement would entirely defeat these functions. Allowing
infringement by academic researchers at state universities, on the other
hand, is unlikely to have significant impact on intellectual property
incentives.472 However, a more limited form of this question is more
471. Cf. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (observing that disclosure of scientific information for future research is
one of the primary purposes of the patent system, and a narrow research exemption that severely
limits such future research is inconsistent with this purpose), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
472. I have explored this ground before, in the context of proposing a limited, non-commercial
license to patents on inventions developed pursuant to government research grants. See Pulsinelli,
supra note 298, at 442–43. This license would be available to all recipients of such government
grants, a category largely comprising researchers at universities and other non-profit institutions,
which would thus address many of the same concerns as the proposed absolute immunity, but it
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troublesome: Why should researchers at state universities enjoy this
freedom, while similarly situated researchers at private universities or
other non-profit facilities do not?473
One answer is that non-profit and private university researchers are no
different, and should be entitled to this absolute immunity to the same
extent as researchers at state universities.474 Such an expansion would
create an even broader sphere for experimenting with protected
technology, which might be a good idea. However, because
overexpansion of the sphere might adversely affect the value of
intellectual property rights, it is preferable, at least at the outset, to limit
the absolute immunity sphere to researchers at state universities.
Furthermore, there are some good reasons for so limiting the sphere.
State universities, with their strong oversight and commitment to public
education, may be the proper setting in which to implement the absolute
immunity policy. State universities are founded with a strong public
purpose, particularly educating the state’s citizens and undertaking
research that benefits them (and, along the way, society as a whole).475
Many of the larger state universities—the ones most likely to take
advantage of the sphere of absolute immunity—were founded pursuant
to the federal land-grant program, which had the express purpose of

would be limited to non-commercial use of the patented technology in research conducted pursuant
to such grants. See id. In that article, I also explored the reasons that granting such a limited license,
to a limited number of basic researchers, would not interfere with the fundamental incentives
provided by patents. See id. at 446–58.
473. Indeed, this argument might form the basis of an equal protection suit by researchers so
situated. Whether such a suit would succeed is beyond the scope of this Article. However, since
“researchers not at state universities” is not a suspect classification, Congress would need only a
rational basis for passing such legislation. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Comm’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,
313–21 (1993) (describing and applying the rational basis test to Congress’s Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984). The analysis that follows suggests such a rational basis.
474. Cf. Volokh, supra note 114, at 1161–62 (observing that Florida Prepaid “generated a
firestorm of criticism” and that the criticism “generally rests on a simple and intuitively appealing
analogy: If a state agency infringes a copyright or patent, it should be treated no differently from a
private entity that infringes a copyright or patent.”). Professor Volokh’s analysis of this analogy is
addressed in more detail supra note 114.
475. See, e.g., Press Release, National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges,
State and Land-Grant Universities Are Powerful Engines for Economic Growth (Aug. 23, 2001),
http://www.nasulgc.org/Whatsnew/Press_Releases/Economic_Impact01.pdf (“State and land-grant
universities provide major stimulus to their state and regional economies—they generate jobs,
attract and help create new high-tech businesses, and increase state tax revenues in addition to
providing a well-educated work-force, according to a report released today. ‘Shaping the Future –
The Economic Impact of Public Universities’ is based on a survey of member institutions conducted
by the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC).”).
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enhancing the education of state citizens in the military and agricultural
arts.476 Subsequent legislation expanded that purpose to include
cooperative agricultural extension.477
Today, America’s land-grant universities continue to fulfill their
democratic mandate for openness, accessibility, and service to
people, and many of these institutions have joined the ranks of
the nation’s most distinguished public research universities.
Through the land-grant university heritage, millions of students
are able to study every academic discipline and explore fields of
inquiry far beyond the scope envisioned in the original landgrant mission.478
Public universities are also subject to strong public oversight, which
should help curb any tendency to excesses, particularly incursions into
the commercial field.479 Such oversight is typically subject to “sunshine”
476. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE UNIVS. & LAND-GRANT COLLS., THE LAND-GRANT TRADITION:
WHAT IS A LAND-GRANT COLLEGE?, http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/land.htm.
477. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE UNIVS. & LAND-GRANT COLLS., THE LAND-GRANT TRADITION:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAND-GRANT SYSTEM: 1862–1995, http://www.nasulgc.org/
publications/Land_Grant/Development.htm (“In 1914 the Smith-Lever Act established the system
of cooperative extension services to bring people the benefits of current developments in the field of
agriculture, home economics and related subjects.”); see also Wikipedia, Land-Grant University,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land-grant_university (“The mission of these institutions, as set forth
in the 1862 Act, is to teach agriculture, military tactics, and the mechanic arts, not to the exclusion
of classical studies, so that members of the working classes might obtain a practical college
education. . . . The mission of the land-grant universities was subsequently expanded . . . to include
cooperative extension—the sending of agents into rural areas to help bring the results of agricultural
research to the end users.”) (last visited Apr. 9, 2007, 16:50 PST).
478. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE UNIVS. & LAND-GRANT COLLS., supra note 476; see also Extension
Serv., N.D. State Univ., Orientation on the Web, Session 6—The Land-Grant University,
http://www.ag.ndsu.nodak.edu/orientation/landgrant/landgrant.htm (“A land-grant university is
directed to educate the people of its state and solve problems through academic, research and
extension programs.”).
479. Professor Peter Menell has extensively analyzed this and other restraints on government
infringements of intellectual property rights, and he suggests that these restraints will minimize the
practical impact of the Florida Prepaid decision. See generally Menell, supra note 13. He observes
that states are subject to certain social and bureaucratic restraints that reduce their inclination to
infringe. See id. at 1428–36. Of particular relevance are his observations that “[t]he public holds
government entities and officials to higher standards of fairness, honesty, openness, and
accountability than private actors,” id. at 1430, and “[g]overnment entities conduct their activities
through public processes,” id. at 1431. Furthermore, “[p]ublic employees are typically accountable
to a wide range of constituencies,” id. at 1431, and “the public sector tends to attract employees who
place a higher value on intrinsic rewards, self-sacrifice, and public service than workers in the
private sector,” id. at 1432. “These [and other] distinctive characteristics of state government
suggest that state entities are unlikely to adopt policies encouraging, permitting, or excusing
infringement of federal intellectual property rights.” Id. He does note, however, that “[o]ne area in
which social and bureaucratic constraints will probably have less of a dampening effect on state
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laws,480 so that the public can monitor exactly what advantage is being
taken of the absolute immunity. Such oversight will help ensure that
research conducted under the protective umbrella of immunity has a
legitimate research purpose and does not spill into the competitive
commercial realm. Limiting absolute immunity to state universities
might also help level the playing field in faculty hiring. State universities
typically cannot offer the same pay that private institutions do, and so
they often lose out in the hiring process.481 Absolute immunity for
researchers at state universities might give these universities something
to offer that the private universities cannot: They can authorize research
into protected materials and techniques, without fear of liability.482 Thus,

infringement relates to state university research.” Id. at 1433. Professor Menell also discusses
market-based restraints on infringement, id. at 1436–38, as well as political restraints, id. at 1438–
48. See also ELEVENTH AMENDMENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 36, at 25
(“Some state officials we contacted noted that the states have strong policy motivations not to
commit intellectual property infringement, as they are governmental authorities committed to
protecting and preserving the rights of their citizens.”). But see Bone, supra note 164, at 1499
(“Although it is conceivable that officials internalize a special role morality as government agents
with a public trust, it is unlikely that faculty and staff at state universities see themselves as
occupying a governmental role or feel especially obligated by virtue of holding a public office.”);
see also id. at 1500 (noting that researchers at state universities often view their infringing conduct
as justified and thus are not concerned with the morality of their conduct).
480. STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, ACCESS TO STUDENT GOVERNMENT MEETINGS AND
INFORMATION (2003), http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=69 (“In general, open meetings
laws, which are found in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, provide legal authority that
allows the public to attend, photograph, record or broadcast the meetings of ‘governmental’ or
‘public bodies’ . . . . [A]lmost all open meetings laws include provisions that apply to the top
governing body of a public college-level institution, such as a board of regents. In many of those
states whose sunshine laws do not specifically mention colleges or universities, the state’s courts or
attorney general’s office has issued an opinion saying that the open meetings law extends to
institutions of higher education.”); see also, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-44-101 to 8-44-108
(2002).
481. See Scott Smallwood, The Price Professors Pay for Teaching at Public Universities,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. Apr. 20, 2001, available at http://chronicle.com/free/v47/i32/32a01801
.htm (documenting the growing salary gap between research professors at public and private
universities); see also Colloquy, The Growing Salary Gap Between Public and Private Universities,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. April 19, 2001, http://chronicle.com/colloquylive/2001/04/salary/
(discussing the reasons for and implications of this gap).
482. This argument might be seen as analogous to part of the policy behind granting immunity to
state officials, which is to ensure that talented individuals are willing to serve in government. See,
e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.3, at 539. Absolute immunity for researchers at state
universities helps ensure that quality researchers like Dr. Little are willing to conduct their research
and teaching at state universities, and thus use their knowledge and skills for the benefit of the
citizens of that state and society as a whole.
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public state universities483 may be the ideal place to create a sphere for
the exploration of protected technology.484
D.

Implementation485

Implementing absolute immunity for researchers at state universities
would require legislative action.486 Although the Supreme Court has
been fairly generous in its qualified immunity rulings, it would exceed
its authority if it tried to implement an absolute immunity for researchers
at state universities. The issue, then, is what provisions such legislation
should contain.
The proposed statute should grant absolute immunity from liability
for intellectual property infringements to researchers at state universities
using patented technology or copyrighted works in the course of their

483. This analysis still leaves a category that is harder to dismiss, which is public/non-state
universities such as community colleges, city universities, etc. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 13, at 1363
(“[A]s local governments have no immunity, one could . . . question why the enforcement strategy
should differ if the defendant is SUNY or CUNY.”). This category does present a problem, as
political subdivisions of a state are typically not entitled to protection under the Eleventh
Amendment, and thus researchers at these universities are unlikely to be able to take advantage of
any traditional immunities. See, e.g., 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 22, ¶ 2.05[C]; CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 22, § 7.4, at 413 (“[T]he Court long has held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
suits against municipalities or political subdivisions of a state.”). However, that result does not
suggest that they need also be eliminated from the proposed absolute immunity, which could easily
be drafted to cover these researchers as well. In any case, this category is likely to be small, and
whether it is included or excluded from absolute immunity likely makes little overall difference.
484. Professor Menell makes a similar point, although with somewhat less enthusiasm:
In view of the multiplicity of institutional constraints upon state infringement of federal
intellectual property rights, the Florida Prepaid decisions are likely to have more of a symbolic
than substantive impact on state policies respecting intellectual property rights. Yet in a few
areas—such as the use of patented research methods in basic research conducted at state
universities—state institutions may toe and possibly cross the line. Here, the narrow
experimental use exception of the federal patent system may undermine innovation by
hindering basic research of the type that is the hallmark of university research Although the
increasingly commercial character of state university research may alter this assessment, the
effect of greater leeway for universities to engage in basic research without concern for patent
licensing arguably will have an ambiguous or positive impact on progress in biomedical and
other areas of scientific research.
Menell, supra note 13, at 1447 (footnote omitted).
485. In a previous paper, I proposed a limited, non-commercial license to patents on inventions
developed pursuant to government research grants. This license would be available to all recipients
of such government grants, for use in research conducted pursuant to such grants. See Pulsinelli,
supra note 298, at 442–74. Because the goals and implementation of that license bear great
similarity to the proposed absolute immunity, the following discussion is a condensed analysis of
the terms of that license, with reference where appropriate to the fuller discussion provided there.
486. No traditional category of absolute immunity would apply to infringements by researchers at
state universities. See supra notes 248–54 and accompanying text.
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research. The term “researcher” should be broadly defined to include not
only professors and principal investigators like Dr. Little but also
postdoctoral fellows, research assistants, graduate and undergraduate
students, technicians, and all others who assist in the research project.
However, the immunity should extend only to infringements that are
committed in the course of the research project, broadly defined.
Immunity should extend to use for non-commercial purposes only.487
The point of the immunity is to give researchers the freedom to explore
patented technology, not to let them compete directly with commercial
entities. However, making this distinction may prove difficult in
practice. One possible way to implement it would be in terms of the
Patent Act’s definition of infringement:
[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent.488
In general, researchers should need only to use, and in some cases make,
the patented invention; offers to sell, sales, or imports of the patented
invention will typically not be necessary.489 Therefore, the statute should
preserve these latter rights in the patentee and not immunize the
researcher from liability for performing them. All rights to
commercialize the invention should remain with the patentee. The
researcher should be immune only insofar as he or she makes or uses the
patented invention in the course of a research project at the state
university.
Alternatively, the proposed statute might utilize a variant of factor
four of the fair use test, which instructs the court to consider “the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.”490 The statute would then focus the analysis on the actual impact
of the infringement on the patentee, rather than on the particular type of
act committed. In crafting such a rule, Congress would need to draft
carefully to avoid circular reasoning: If the use is not protected as a fair
use, then the researcher would need to pay a royalty to use the
technology. Therefore, protecting the use as fair would deprive the

487. See Pulsinelli, supra note 298, at 468–73.
488. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
489. With some possible exceptions for sharing materials or producing particular pieces of
apparatus. See Pulsinelli, supra note 298, at 469–70.
490. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).

368

PULSINELLI.DOC

5/22/2007 7:47:14 PM

Freedom to Explore
patentee of that royalty. Depriving the patentee of the royalty would
have an impact on the market (in the loss of that royalty), and thus the
use should be deemed not fair. Under this reasoning, no use can ever be
fair, because any use will always deny the patentee a royalty.491 The
statute would have to be clear that the type of economic impact in
question is the infringer’s usurping the patentee’s market, not merely his
or her depriving the patentee of a royalty.
However, the prohibition on commercial activity becomes murky
when applied in the context of university/industry collaborations and
funding agreements. Modern laboratories commonly receive funds from
commercial entities, often in exchange for rights in the fruits of the
research.492 Should such research be immunized because it is performed
by researchers at state universities, or should be it not be immunized
because its fruits will go, at least partially, to a commercial entity? This
question is difficult to answer. I suggest that the source of funding
should be ignored—in determining whether absolute immunity applies,
the only relevant issue should be whether the accused infringer is a
researcher at a state university—but with reservations. In many cases,
the question is irrelevant, because commercialization of the research will
not be covered by the immunity, and the commercialized research will,
insofar as it still incorporates the patented technology, need to be
licensed from the patentee.493 In other cases, however, the patented
invention may be only a step in the research toward creating the
commercial technology, without the patented technology being
incorporated into the final product, which is more problematic.494
Perhaps this situation could be handled with a compulsory royalty on the
491. The court arguably fell into this circular reasoning in American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). The court was considering whether scientists could rely on
the fair use defense when they copied journal articles to assist their research or if they instead
needed a license to copy. Id. at 914. The court concluded that such use was not fair because copying
of journal articles harmed the market for the journal. Id. at 929–31. The source of this harm was
that, if the copying were not fair use, the journal could have received a royalty fee in exchange for a
license to copy—even though whether such a license to copy was necessary was exactly the
question it was attempting to answer in the first place. See id.; see also id. at 938 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out the circularity of the majority’s reasoning); MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY,
supra note 187, at 536 (discussing the circularity in American Geophysical Union); SCHECHTER &
THOMAS, supra note 320, § 10.2, at 228–31 (discussing circularity generally and in American
Geophysical Union, as well as ways to avoid it).
492. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 164, at 1474–76 (discussing different types of arrangements
between state universities and the private sector).
493. See Pulsinelli, supra note 298, at 447–48.
494. See id. at 448–57 (discussing situations in which this is or is not a problem).
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sold product.495 Furthermore, trying to determine whether immunity
applies based on what percentage of funding comes from what source is
likely to be difficult in many cases, and will create unnecessary
uncertainty.496 Finally, because the proposed immunity traces its roots to
the Eleventh Amendment,497 basing the immunity on the status of the
researcher as a state employee, rather than on his or her source of
funding, seems more consistent with these roots.498
The statutory provision must also be drafted to cover all types of
relief in all types of suits. As discussed earlier, researchers at state
universities may be sued in their official capacities for injunctive
relief499 and in their personal capacities for both damages500 and
injunctive relief.501 Both injunctions and money damages can
significantly harm the researcher, and thus the researchers would need to
be immunized against both types of suits.
Immunizing researchers at state universities is also likely to have
international implications. The United States is a member of several
treaties and other conventions that require member states to maintain a
495. See id. at 449 & n.325 (proposing such a solution); see also id. at 423 & n.192 (discussing
the issue more generally (citing Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 58 (2001), and Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and
the Patent Bargain, 81 WIS. L. REV. 81, 142–46 (2004))).
496. Cf. id. at 473–74 & n.423 (discussing the practical difficulties in basing eligibility for a
license on the percentage of funding that comes from the government versus other sources).
497. The remaining connection is admittedly somewhat tenuous.
498. Professor Robert Bone discusses potential problems that state sovereign immunity creates
for university-private sector dealings. See Bone, supra note 164, at 1497–1511. These problems
would be worse if researchers at state universities were granted absolute immunity. He views
contract law as a partial solution to some of these problems, particularly those problems involving
direct relationships between the university and the private sector party. See id. at 1489–91, 1504–11;
see also Menell, supra note 13, at 1425–28 (discussing potential use of contract as basis for seeking
damages for intellectual property infringements by states); id. at 1437–38 (discussing such contract
actions in the context of state universities). However, Professor Bone notes that the possibility of
immunized infringement is likely to move some forms of scientific discovery out of the patent
system, to be protected instead by secrecy, to the detriment of the scientific enterprise as whole. See
Bone, supra note 164, at 1505–08. Detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article,
but while the point is well taken, I believe that the effect of this increased secrecy will be somewhat
limited, and the previously discussed gains from absolute immunity outweigh this problem.
499. See supra Part II.B.
500. See supra Part II.C.
501. State officials can still be sued in their personal capacities for injunctive relief even if they
can claim qualified immunity against suit for damages. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, § 8.6.3,
at 529 (“Qualified immunity exists only as to suits for damages, not as to suits for injunctive
relief.”).
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certain base level of protection for intellectual property, and that restrict
their right to make exceptions to this protection.502 Granting absolute
immunity to researchers at state universities may run afoul of the broad
terms of those agreements.503 However, these agreements do contain
provisions that authorize certain limited exceptions to the general rules,
including one for “public noncommercial use.”504 Although these
provisions are not entirely clear and a complete analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article, a cursory review suggests that a limited exception
for researchers at state universities would likely fit within these
exceptions.505 International intellectual property diplomacy is a bigger
issue.506 The United States is frequently pushing the rest of the world to
tighten up their intellectual property regimes, and immunizing some of
its citizens for infringement would be inconsistent with those
initiatives.507 However, if it is strictly limited to the research context, the
proposed immunity should present few real problems on this front.
Timing issues are also important, as suddenly immunizing a group of
researchers can dramatically change the calculus on the value of a
patent, leading to possible takings claims under the Fifth Amendment.508
Because a patent is generally considered a strong property right,
patentees are likely to resist the sudden imposition of a limitation on
who can be sued under the patent by asserting that the change effects a
taking of a property right without just compensation.509 This concern
502. See Menell, supra note 13, at 1449–55; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1173–88.
503. See Menell, supra note 13, at 1449–55; Berman et al., supra note 13, at 1173–88. Both of
these articles discuss the problems that state sovereign immunity creates with respect to complying
with treaty and international agreement obligations, because foreign patentees now lack a remedy
against states. An absolute immunity would, of course, create an even more extreme
noncompliance.
504. Menell, supra note 13, at 1450. This provision contains notification and compensation
requirements that may make fitting the proposed absolute immunity within its terms problematic.
See id.
505. Indeed, many European nations that are signatories to these treaties and agreements have
codified experimental use provisions in their laws. See Eisenberg, supra note 309, at 1018 n.6 (“The
patent laws of many other countries, including Japan and most members of the European Economic
Community, recognize an experimental use exemption that is not limited to specific fields of
technology.”); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 307, at 111–112 (discussing the
experimental use exemption in other countries).
506. The problems that state sovereign immunity creates for intellectual property diplomacy are
discussed in Menell, supra note 13, at 1455–64.
507. See id.
508. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
509. As I have noted previously, patent law reform raises some very interesting questions of
takings law. See Pulsinelli, supra note 298, at 467 & n.395. Further exposition of this issue is
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could be addressed by making the change prospective, applying only to
patents filed after the effective date of the legislation. Some disgruntled
patentees might still complain that they started the research project based
on the expectation of obtaining a patent that would let them sue such
researchers, and depriving them of that expectation is a taking of
property without compensation. Given the attenuated nature of the harm
and the historical experimental use exemption and fair use doctrines,
however, such a suit seems somewhat tenuous at best and unlikely to
succeed.510
When I presented this proposal to others, some reacted negatively to
what they perceived as the grant of a free boon to researchers at state
universities. They suggested one way to make it more palatable was to
require, as a quid pro quo, that anyone whose work infringes the patents
of others forego any patenting of that work.511 While such a proposal has
a certain aesthetic appeal, it founders on grounds both doctrinal and
practical. From a doctrinal perspective, the vision of a subsidy to
researchers is not entirely accurate. While it is true that researchers
benefit from immunity from infringement suits, the premise behind the
immunity proposal is that society also benefits from having a sphere in
which research into patented inventions can take place, without concern
over patent infringement.512 Many interesting and socially valuable
results are likely to arise from this limited sphere of freedom, results that
might otherwise be prevented by the intellectual property laws. Thus, we
grant researchers immunity not to improve their careers but to get
valuable research for society, much as we grant patents in the first place

beyond the scope of this Article and is left for future development.
510. A detailed analysis of whether such an argument would be successful is well beyond the
scope of this Article.
511. Similar suggestions appear in the literature in conjunction with various proposals to
implement a broad experimental use exemption. For example, Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss
describes her plan thus:
Under this plan, a university or other nonprofit research institution that wants to use patented
material and cannot obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms could use the
technology without permission if it is willing to sign a waiver. The waiver would require the
institution to promptly publish the results of work conducted with the patented technology and
to refrain from patenting discoveries made in the course of that work.
Dreyfuss, supra note 309, at 471 (citing Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting
Genetic Material: A Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003)).
512. See supra Part V.B.
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not to reward research efforts but in exchange for knowledge that is
valuable to society.513
Furthermore, such a quid pro quo rule runs directly counter to the
thrust of the Bayh-Dole Act.514 The Bayh-Dole Act permits institutions
that receive federal funding to patent any inventions that arise from the
research and license them commercially, keeping any proceeds.515 The
theory behind the Bayh-Dole Act was that the federal government was
spending large amounts of taxpayer money to fund academic research,
but it was not receiving much return in the form of consumer
products.516 Congress studied the problem and concluded that the reason
for this low conversion rate, at least in part, was the lack of patent
protection on the inventions resulting from federally funded research.517
In the absence of protection, no company had the incentive to invest in
converting the invention into a commercial product, because once it
successfully created a product, any other company was free to piggyback
on the investment, selling its own version of the product at a lower price
because it faced much lower research and development costs.518 In
response, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act,519 which permitted
researchers who received federal funding to patent and license any
resulting inventions.520 Since the passage of the Act, patenting in
universities and other federal funding recipients has exploded.521 The
result is that more government-funded technology is getting into the
hands of private industry and thence to the public, and in the process
sometimes creating major new revenue streams for the institutions.522

513. The information-sharing function of patents is discussed supra notes 438–42 and
accompanying text.
514. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). For a more complete
description of the Bayh-Dole Act, its history, and some of its consequences, see generally Pulsinelli,
supra note 298, and Eisenberg, supra note 451.
515. See Pulsinelli, supra note 298, at 402–04.
516. See id. at 397–98.
517. See id. at 398–402.
518. See id. at 394.
519. Bayh-Dole Act, Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
520. See Pulsinelli, supra note 298, at 402–09.
521. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 453, at 292 (“The patenting trend accelerated significantly,
however, after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. . . . This almost ten-fold increase in
university patenting was significantly greater than the two-fold increase in overall patenting during
the same time period . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
522. See Pulsinelli, supra note 298, at 410.
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Most (though not all) observers view Bayh-Dole as a success and credit
it with improving the return on federal investment.523
Implementing a rule that requires researchers at state universities to
forgo patenting of their inventions is inconsistent with the vision behind
the Bayh-Dole Act that granting rights in technology is the best way for
taxpayers to get a return on their investments in technology research. In
the absence of patents, the resulting technology is likely to languish,
with no company having sufficient incentive to develop it further.
Denying patents to researchers at state universities might thus spark a
return to the problems that existed prior to Bayh-Dole, particularly
because state universities are such significant recipients of federal
funding.524
The quid pro quo rule also presents practical difficulties. For a
researcher to know whether he or she is permitted to patent a piece of
research, the researcher must know whether he or she infringed any
patents in the course of the research. Sometimes, the answer may clearly
be yes—the researcher may later learn of a patent that was clearly
infringed, or the immunity may have led to knowing infringement.
However, in many cases, the issue is not so clear. The researcher may
invest considerable money and effort to obtain a patent, only to discover
that he or she infringed another’s patent along the way and therefore
must now dedicate the patent to the public. Or the researcher may appear
to infringe a patent, but may have a good argument that in fact the patent
is not infringed, either because the claims are invalid or because the
research did not infringe the patent claims as properly construed. The
only way to determine whether the research did in fact infringe the
patent (and was therefore ineligible for patent protection) would be to
litigate the issue, which is a time-consuming and expensive course—and
the point of granting immunity to these researchers in the first place is to
shield them from just this sort of distraction.525 In the meantime, because
523. See id. at 410–12.
524. Of course, not all agree with this analysis. Some commentators believe that the Bayh-Dole
Act has been a disaster for research, tying up important research with proprietary rights that prevent
further research while providing very little in real returns to the universities. See generally, e.g.,
Eisenberg, supra note 451; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 455. Indeed, as noted above, this tie-up
of rights is one of the reasons behind my absolute immunity proposal. See supra notes 451–55 and
accompanying text. For this group of commentators, anything that thwarts Bayh-Dole is to be
praised, not rejected.
525. Furthermore, in the absence of an actual infringement suit (or a threat of suit sufficient to
permit the filing of a declaratory judgment action), a judicial opinion on infringement might well
run afoul of the case or controversy requirement.
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of the statutory filing deadlines for patent applications, the researcher
will not be able to wait for the outcome of the litigation and will have to
proceed with the patent prosecution process, without knowing if he or
she will be able to keep any resulting patent or will be forced to dedicate
it to the public. As a consequence, any patent issued to a researcher
eligible for the immunity (whether formally exercised or not) will
remain under a cloud: The patent will be invalidated if that researcher is
ever found to have infringed any patents in the course of the research,
because such an infringement would invoke the “no patenting” terms of
the quid pro quo rule. Also problematic is the case where, halfway
through a project, the researcher discovers that he or she has
inadvertently used an infringing technique, and at that point switches to
a non-infringing technique—should the researcher be permitted to patent
the fruits of the research?
These questions demonstrate the great complexity that would be
added by a rule that requires forfeiture of patent rights in exchange for
immunity from infringement suits. Given the doctrinal difficulties
presented above, it hardly seems worthwhile to create a complex statute
that can handle these practical difficulties. The immunity inquiry is
greatly simplified if researchers at state universities are free to infringe
patents in the course of their research, without simultaneously having to
wonder whether they are giving up their rights to patent the research.
CONCLUSION
Academic basic researchers, including researchers at state universities
like Dr. Little, are increasingly threatened by suits for intellectual
property infringement, especially patent infringement. These researchers
often believe that such threats are entirely improper because they are
completely at odds with the norms of basic research, which require the
sharing of materials and techniques in aid of the common grand
enterprise of unraveling the secrets of nature. As a partial solution to this
problem, those researchers at state universities should, under current
law, be able to assert a qualified immunity defense in infringement suits
pursued against them in their personal capacities. They should be
granted this qualified immunity as long as they had a reasonable, goodfaith belief that their research did not infringe the patents (or copyrights)
in question. The best way to test the reasonableness of their belief is to
use the existing willful infringement doctrines, so that any infringement
that is not willful is excused from liability.
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However, the qualified immunity defense as it exists under current
law still leaves researchers open to the risk of considerable personal
liability, and, potentially, of research-halting injunctions. In order to
further the progress of science and free these researchers to make
important scientific discoveries, legislation should move beyond the
restrictions of current law and should grant researchers at state
universities absolute immunity from liability for intellectual property
infringements. Such a statutory absolute immunity will create in the state
universities a sphere where patented inventions and discoveries (as well
as copyrighted works) can be further explored and improved upon,
without fear of infringement liability. Creating such a sphere will serve,
at least in part, to counter the current trend towards the diminution of the
public domain. It will also help break through the “thickets” that may be
arising as ever more pieces of the overall research endeavor become
ensnared by intellectual property rights. Society should grant these
researchers immunity so that we can overcome some of the roadblocks
to further research and reap the full rewards of our intellectual property
protection system.
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